SEC PROXY REGULATION: STEPS TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE STOCKHOLDER PARTICIPATION by EMERSON, FRANK D. & LATCHAM, FRANKLIN C.




IN the modem corporation, stockholders' meetings have become
largely a formality. The hundreds of stockholders cannot hope to
attend the meeting in person. Their only opportunity for effective
participation in corporate affairs lies in the exercise of their right to
vote by proxy. If that opportunity is not afforded, they are prevented
as a practical matter from expressing their will as proprietors of the
corporation, and control of the corporation by management is com-
plete.
Prior to 1934, the proxy machinery had in many instances degen-
erated into a device for the perpetuation in office of the management
group and the ratification of its policies. Particularly in the larger cor-
porations, the stockholders, the legal owners, had almost no voice in
management.J The general practice was for management, charging the
corporate treasury,2 to solicit proxies giving the proxy-holder broad,
discretionary powers. In some cases the proxies were good for a num-
ber of years.3 Ordinarily, the proxy authorized some person or persons
to vote the stockholders' shares to elect a board of directors and to take
any other action considered "desirable." Too frequently the owner of
the shares was given no assurance that the items mentioned (that is if
t Interpretative Attorney for the Cleveland Regional Office of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission.
j-Assistant Professor, Western Reserve University School of Law. The opinions
of the authors expressed herein are their own and do not necessarily reflect those of the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
1. The problem is analyzed in BEmix & M.Axs, THE MODMN COrMATION A2,D
PRavATE PROPERTv 80-90, 139, 207, 244-5 (1932); SEC, REPonT ox Tnn Smry AzD
INVESTIGATION OF =ie Wopx, Acrivrnms, PERSONNEL, AND FuncTiois oF PrToEcrvz
AND REORGANIZATION COITISITTEES, pt. VII, pp. 67, 135, 233 c seq. (1938). See also
BU RHAm, Tn uMAwAGER AL REVOLUTIo (1941), esp. c. VII; Douglas, Dircclorr Who
Do Not Direct, 47 HAnv. L. Rv. 1305 (1934).
2. Such a charge was upheld in Bounds v. Stephenson, 187 S.AV. 1031 (Te. Civ.
App. 1916) ; Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen Corp., 20 Del. CI 78, 171 At.
226 (1934). See also Lawyers' Advertising Co. v. Consolidated Railway Lighting &
Refrigerating Co., 187 N.Y. 395, 80 N.E. 199 (1907). Note, 53 Hnv. L. Rav. 1165,
1167, 1168 (1940) ; Comment, 33 IL. L. Rav. 914, 917 (1939).
3. In a number of states pro.-es are limited in duration to eleven months from the
date of execution unless the stockholder specifies a longer period. E.g., CAT. Co.W. Coaz
§ 2226 (Deering, 1949); Conn. GEN. STAT. § 5161 (1949); N.Y. GEN. ConP. LAw § 19;
Oxio GLx. CODE § 8623-53 (Page, 1949); PENN. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-504 (Purdon,
1938). Some jurisdictions place a maximum time limit upon the validity of proxies.
E.g., CA. Co"P. CoDE § 2226 (Deering, 1949) (7 years); Prn. STAT. Am:r. tit. 15,
§ 2852-504 (Purdon, 1938) (3 years).
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any were mentioned) in the notice of meeting were the only ones the
management expected to bring up for consideration at the meeting.
Usually the stockholder was simply invited to sign his name and return
his proxy without being furnished the information essential to the in-
telligent exercise of his rights of franchise. 4
State statutes 5 provided few, if any, requirements that adequate
information be given stockholders,6 and the decisional law was not
much more stringent in this regard.7 Moreover, the proxies were often
stated to be irrevocable, although they are actually a form of agency
agreement and therefore ordinarily revocable by either party unless
coupled with an interest." They were an inverted type of agency,
however, for the agent prescribed his powers for the principal. And,
although the proxy holder was said to be under a fiduciary duty to the
stockholder,' in reality he gave his primary allegiance to management. 10
4. See 10 SEC ANN. REP. 51 (1944).
5. The common law did not recognize the validity of corporate proxies. By the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, however, corporate charters permitted vote by
proxy. Today all states but two, Texas and Iowa, expressly recognize the right to vote
by proxy, and in those two states the privilege is recognized by "custom," or, if permitted,
by charter or by-law. Axe, Corporate Proxies, 41 Micz. L. REv. 38, 46 (1942).
6. Statutes commonly require notice of meetings. In some the purposes of the meet-
ing must be disclosed. See, e.g., N.Y. STOCK CoRP. LAW art. 5, § 45; Ouio GEN, CODE
§ 8623-44 (Baldwin, 1949). But this requirement is usually satisfied by a brief statement
that by-laws are to be amended, or officers elected. See Note, 53 IARV. L. Rzv. 1165,
1166 (1940).
7. Judicial requirements of adequate disclosure are based primarily upon the proxy's
agency relationship with the stockholder. The proxy may not use his powers for self ag-
grandizement without full disclosure to his principal. Rice & Hutchins v. Triplex Shoe
Co., 16 Del. Ch. 298, 147 Atl. 317 (1929) ; Blair v. F. H. Smith Co., 18 Del. Ch. 150, 156
Atl. 207 (1931). Proxies have been characterized as "limited" and "general." The au-
thorization of a "limited" proxy is analogous to the creation of a special agency. It may
be exercised on a specific subject only and not on other matters about which the stock-
holder-principal has not been notified and has therefore not authorized. A "general"
proxy, however, is similar to a general agency and gives the holder the right to represent
his principal on all matters of ordinary business. This is the rule irrespective of whether
the business was disclosed to the stockholder, in the absence of fraud. The courts have
construed the term "ordinary business" broadly. It does not include, however, authoriza-
tion in connection with "extraordinary" business, such as the sale of the entire assets, vol-
untary liquidation, or recapitalization. Comment, 33 ILI. L. REV. 914, 917 (1939); Axe,
Corporate Proxies, 41 MicH. L. REv. 38, 249 (1942) ; Note, 53 HARv. L. REv. 1165 (1940).
Despite the stockholder's right of full disclosure in some cases, the difficulty of enforcing
his right by trial is obvious.
8. Axe, Corporate Proxies, 41 Micr. L. RFv. 38, 258 (1942). Irrevocable proxies
are apparently prohibited by statute in New York and Pennsylvania. N.Y. STocK CO1r.
LAW art. 5, § 47; N.Y. GENERAL CoRP. LAW § 19; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 668; Re Germicide
Co., 65 Hun. 606, 20 N.Y. Supp. 495 (1892) ; PENN. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-504 (Pur-
don, 1938).
9. Blair v. F. H. Smith Co., 18 Del. Ch. 150, 156 Atl. 207 (1931) ; cf. United Milk
Products Corp. v. Lovell, 75 F.2d 923 (6th Cir. 1935) ; SEC RExoRT, op. cit. supra note 1,
pt. VII, p. 8; Axe, Corporate Proxies, 41 Mim. L. REv. 38, 248 (1941) ; Comment, 33 ILL.
L. REv. 914,915-16,920 (1939).
10. "Legally, the proxy is an agent for the shareholder; and necessarily under a
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It thus became increasingly apparent that in order for the stock-
holder to express adequately his desires as a legal owner, the proxy
machinery must more nearly approximate the individually attended
stockholders' meeting. Stockholders voting by proxy must be afforded
adequate knowledge of the corporation's financial condition and of the
issues to be decided at the stockholders' meeting."1 They must have
an opportunity to express clearly their desires to those acting as pro.es
for them. And if an individual stockholder or group of stockholders
outside of management wishes to raise an issue before the meeting,
they must have an opportunity to reach other stockholders via the
proxy device.
Congress attempted to achieve these results through Section 14 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as implemented by the proxy
regulations which the SEC was authorized to prescribe. The SEC,
"listed" companies, 12 and the investing public have now had two years
of experience with the Commission's current regulations.' 3 It is the
purpose of this article, as a third "proxy season" 1- under the new rules
is opening, to review briefly the development of proxy regulation and
to interpret the current regulations, especially in the light of the experi-
ence of the past two years. In addition, an evaluation will be made of
proposals for further effectuating the policies underlying regulation of
the proxy device.
duty of fidelity to him. Factually, he is a dummy for the management, and is expected to
do as he is told. Indeed, proxies are often clerks in the management, perhaps assisted by
the company's attorney. The vote when mobilized really represents the will of the Direc-
tors." BE=i & Ef-ANs, THE MODE=N CORPORATION AND PRIvATc Pnorr 245 (1932).
11. The Senate Committee report on Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act stated
in part: "In order that the stockholder may have adequate knowledge as to the manner in
which his interests are being served, it is essential that he be enlightened not only as to
the financial condition of the corporation, but also as to the major questions of policy,
which are decided at stockholders' meetings. Too often proxies are solicited vithout ex-
planation to the stockholder of the real nature of the matters for which authority to cast
his vote is sought!' SEN. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934). See also H.R.
REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
12. A "listed" company may be defined, for purposes of this article, as a firm or other
business association which has one or more classes of its non-exempted securities listed
and registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 STAT.
881, 892 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 781 (1946) (hereinafter referred to as the Exchange
Act) on a "national securities exchange."
13. The revised Regulation X-14 became effective December 18, 1947, but it vas op-
tional with persons making a solicitation whether to follow the old or new regulations
with respect to any solicitation commenced prior to February 15, 1948. Further amend-
ments to the revised Regulation became effective on December 15, 1948. See Exchange
Act Release No. 4185 (Nov. 5, 1948).
14. The 'Ides of farch" has more than a Shakesperean significance, not only to the
tax lawyer, but also to the corporation or securities lawyer, for approximately 72 per cent
of all proxy statements filed with the SEC during any year are for stockholder meetings
held in the now-at-hand three-month period of March through May. 13 SEC AINN. RrP.
41 (1947).
1950]
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CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE SEC REGULATIONS
Section 14 consists of two paragraphs. Paragraph (a) authorizes
the Commission to prescribe rules and regulations concerning the
solicitation of proxies, consents, or authorizations in respect of any
non-exempt 15 security listed and registered on a national securities
exchange.' 6 Acting pursuant to the rule-making power thus granted,
the Commission has promulgated Regulation X-14 governing the form
and content of proxy ballots and proxy statements. The Commission
has not, however, directly exercised its rule-making power under para-
graph (b) .17 This paragraph reflects an awareness of the fact that a
great many securities are carried for customer-stockholders in so-called
"street" form, commonly in broker-dealers' names. As a result, before
the Securities and Exchange Act, the customer-stockholders sometimes
did not even receive notice of the stockholders' meeting much less any
essential information or an opportunity to vote. This dilemma has
been largely removed, however, through the promulgation of remedial
rules by the New York Stock Exchange, which is supervised by the
Commission under general power granted by Section 19(b) of the
Act.18
Complementing the Exchange Act authority to formulate proxy
15. The term "exempted security" is defined in Section 3(a) (12) of the Exchange
Act.
16. Section 14(a) reads: "It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails
or by any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange or otherwise to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit
any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted
security) registered on any national securities exchange in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors."
17. Section 14(b) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any member of a national securi-
ties exchange or any broker or dealer who transacts a business in securities through the
medium of any such member to give a proxy, consent, or authorization in respect of any
security registered on a national securities exchange and carried for the account of a
customer in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors,"
18. The New York Stock Exchange's Rules 870 and 872 provide in part: "Rule 870.
No member firm shall give a proxy to vote stock registered in its name, except as required
or permitted under the provisions of Rule 872, unless the firm is the beneficial owner of
such stock." "Rule 872. A member firm shall give a proxy for stock registered in its
name, at the direction of the beneficial owner ... ." Rules 870 through 875 relate gener-
ally to proxies and proxy material, and are followed by a schedule of solicitation charges,
exclusive of postage, approved by the Exchange's Board of Governors. See Naw YORc
SToCx EXCH1ANGE DmcroRY AND GuWE, E-555-7. The Philadelphia-Baltimore Stock
Exchange has comparable rules. While only three other exchanges, Boston, Los Angeles,
and San Francisco, have proxy rules and their rules permit their members to execute
proxies without restriction, the various regional exchanges as a matter of practice or
custom ordinarily follow the policy expressed in the rules of the New York Stock Ex-
change if they have not adopted rules of their own.
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rules for "listed" companies are Sections 12(e) of the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935, and 20(a) of the Investment Company
Act of 1940.1' These sections are applicable, irrespective of listing, to
electric and gas public utility holding companies and their subsidiaries
registered under the Holding Company Act, and to investment com-
panies registered under the Investment Company Act. :  Pursuant to
Section 12(e) the Commission has adopted Rule U-62 relating to
solicitations in connection with a reorganization or other transaction
which is the subject of an application or declaration under the Holding
Company Act. Rule U-61 relates to all other proxy solicitations and
affords information to investors in registered utilities through the
mechanism of Regulation X-14.
The Commission has proceeded carefully in its development of rules
which would place the solicitation of proxies on a more sound and
equitable basis than had existed prior to July 1, 1934, the effective
date of the Exchange Act. The first set of rules, seven in number and
designated Rules LAl through LA7, was not adopted until Septem-
ber 24, 1935.21 Although the LA rules are no longer in effect, they are
of far more than passing interest because they established an effective,
three-way regulatory pattern still discernible in the current proxy
rules.
First, solicitors had to furnish a "brief description" of the matters
intended to be considered in the exercise of the proxy, together with
the action proposed to be taken by the holder of the proxy.22 Names of
nominees for officers or directors could be omitted. However, the rules
did provide for notice to stockholders if a director opposed manage-
19. Section 12(e), Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 SrTr. 803, 824
(1935), 15 U.S.C. §§ 79, 791(e) (1946) (hereinafter referred to as the Holding Company
Act); Section 20(a), Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 789, 822 (1940), 15
U.S.C. §§80a-1, 80a-20(a) (1946) (hereinafter referred to as the Investment Company
Act). Reference may also be made to Section 11(g) of the Holding Company Act, and
Rules U-60 and U-62 to U-65 for special proxy rules applicable to plans of reorganiza-
tion under the Holding Company Act. See also Holding Co. Act Release No. 7020 (Dec.
2, 1946) for an "order" entered under 12(e) directing Standard Gas and Electric Com-
pany to furnish two stockholders a stock list.
20. If an investment company owning securities of a company subject to the proxy
regulation should solicit its own security holders for pro.des authorizing the investment
company to solicit proxies from other holders of the portfolio company's securities, the
result would be a "solicitation on a solicitation" both of which would apparently be sub-
ject to the proxy rules.
21. See Exchange Act Release No. 378 (Class A), containing the text of the rules
and companion Release No. 378 (Class B), consisting of a statement by the Commission,
both dated Sept. 24, 1935.
22. LAI defined the term "solicitation" to include generally any communication or re-
quest for a proxy, consent or authorization, or the furnishing of any form of proxy,
whether or not the form was in blank Compare definition in present X-14A-1.
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ment in certain instances.2 3 The limited information afforded in the
LA rules by the identification and certain "brief description" provi-
sions was required to be furnished irrespective of whether the solicita-
tion was on behalf of management or outsiders, although the security
holder was required to be advised whether the proxy was solicited by
management. Secondly, the rules placed upon management the duty
ofjmailing proxy material to record owners upon the request of a
security holder, if the management was also engaged in soliciting
proxies. The third principal feature of the LA rules was a provision
making it unlawful to employ materially false or misleading statements
in connection with solicitations. 24
Although the Commission realized that the LA rules were neither
specific nor comprehensive enough to supply holders with the informa-
tion necessary to formulate an informed decision on how to cast their
votes, it was felt that further experience was needed before a more
adequate set of rules could be adopted. 25 Nearly three years after the
promulgation of the LA rules, the Commission announced rules of a
more positive nature. 5 The revision, designated Regulation X-14,
had as its keystone an important new requirement that a "proxy
statement" must be sent to each person whose proxy was solicited.Y
Another significant new provision required that the security holder be
23. LA3(a) (2) If either management or its opposition engaged persons for compen-
sation to solicit on their behalf, that fact and the name of the paid solicitor's principal was
required to be furnished. LA3 (a) (4).
24. LA4. The rule made it unlawful to employ fraud in seeking proxies, consents, or
authorizations in respect of non-exempt, listed securities. This provision was not unlike
the mail fraud statute, 35 STAT. 1130 (1909), 18 U.S.C. § 338 (1946).
25. 10 SEC ANN. REP. 51 (1944).
26. Exchange Act Release No. 1823 (Aug. 11, 1938). The regulation was an-
nounced August 11, 1938, and became effective October 1, 1938. See Dean, Non-Con phl-
ance With Proxy Regulations, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 483 (1939): Comment, Regillation of
Proxy Solicitation by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 33 ILL. L. REV. 914
(1939).
27. Former X-14A-1 and present X-14A-3. Then, as now, there was no require-
ment that all security holders be solicited. Some, none, or all may be solicited, but those
solicited must receive a proxy statement. While the requirement that a solicited investor
be furnished an informative "proxy statement" was novel, it had a precedent in Section
5(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 STAT. 74 et seq., 15 U.S.C. §77 ct seq. (1946)
(hereinafter referred to as the Securities Act), which makes it mandatory that a pros-
pectus of defined content be delivered in connection with the sale to investors of securities
registered under that Act. In addition to expanding the limited informational require-
ments of the LA rules, the first X-14 also stipulated that the proxy statement meet pre-
scribed legibility standards (former X-14A-3 and present X-14A-5(d)), that it set
forth the power of the security holder to revoke his proxy and the rights of dissenters
(former and present Schedule 14A, Items 1 and 2 of same schedule), that it disclose the
expenses of the solicitation (Schedule 14A, former and present Item 3), and that it pro-
vide in certain instances various financial data (former Schedule 14A, Items 9(e), 10(f),
11(b), 11(c)(2), and compare present X-14A-3(b) and Item 15, Schedule 14A).
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afforded the opportunity to direct how his vote should be cast on each
of the matters to be considered." When the solicitation covered the
election of directors, the new regulation stipulated that the proxy
statement must include information in regard to each nominee.0 The
original X-14 also added other important provisionsP
The regulation was amended in certain details in 1940 after one year
of operation, 3' the principal change being a requirement that the proxy,
proxy statement, and other proxy soliciting material be filed with the
Commission at least 10 days before the beginning of the solicitation. 32
A second group of amendments to Regulation X-14 was adopted in
1942.33 As in the instance of the 1940 amendments, they did not con-
stitute a general revision of the regulation, but they did effect five sub-
stantive changes suggested by additional ex\perience with the regula-
tion.34
28. Former X-14A-2 and present X-14A-4(b).
29. Former Schedule 14A, Item 6, and compare present Items 6 and 7.
30. See, e.g., the exemptions provided in former X-14A-7(a), (b), (d) and (e).
Compare present X-14A-2.
31. Exchange Act Release No. 2376 (Jan. 12, 1940). See Bernstein & Fischer, The
Regulation of Proxy Solicitation by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 7 U. o?
CL L. REv. 226 (1940).
32. Former X-14A-4(b). See Release No. 2376, supra note 31, at 7-8. The pre-
vious rules did not require the filing of the proxy material until solicitation had started.
Consequently companies were considerably embarrassed when required under the anti-fraud
and other proxy rules to send out supplemental material to correct deficiencies which the
Commission's staff could have pointed out in advance had it bad an opportunity to .xaminn
the material before it was mailed. Exchange Act Release No. 1823 (Aug. 11, 1938); cf.
Dean, supra note 26, at 483. The ten-day waiting period, during which proxy material is
processed, and which may be shortened by the Commission upon a showing of unusual
circumstances, has virtually eliminated this difficulty. 10 SEC AN.. REP. 51 (1944);
Bernstein & Fischer, supra note 31, at 237. See present X-14A-6. Other new matter
inserted in Regulation X-14 by the 1940 amendments included provisions supplementing
the remuneration disclosure requirements, provisions amplifying the disclosures of nomi-
nees' securities holdings, amendments to the requirement for communication to security
holders of matters which minority groups have indicated that they will propose at the
meeting, and a provision expanding the definition of the term "solicitation". Exchange
Act Release No. 2376, pp. 2-6, 9, 11-12, (Jan. 12, 1940).
33. Exchange Act Release No. 3347 (Dec. 18, 1942).
34. 10 SEC AxN. REP. 52 (1944). The requirement concerning information regarding
remuneration and securities ownership of corporate managers was amplified, and pro-
vision was made for a brief statement of the principal occupation of all directors, and a
resumi of the business experience of new candidates. (Former Items 5 and 7, Schedule
14A, and compare present Items 6 and 7 of Schedule 14A). The company's annual re-
port was required to accompany or precede management proxy statements if directors
were to be elected. (Former X-14A-1(b) and compare present X-14A-3). Security
holders opposing management were afforded not more than 100 words in the management
proxy statement if timely notice was given management. (Former X-14A-7 and present
X-14A--8). The exemption which was granted proxy solicitations made without use of
the mails or of interstate commerce was abolished. (Exchange Act Release No. 3347,
1950]
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In 1947 and 1948 further revisions of Regulation X-14 were effected.
The more important among the 1947 amendments 1 were the relaxa-
tion of the officers' individual remuneration disclosure provisions to
reach only those of the three highest paid officers whose aggregate
remuneration exceeded $20,000 each per annum,8 and provision for
the filing of follow-up or additional soliciting material, in general, at
least two days, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays excluded, prior to
its use.," The 1948 amendments, which became finally effective Decem-
ber 15, 1948,11 included provisions to the effect that no proxy could
confer authority to vote at any annual meeting other than the one
next following the solicitation,3" that the proxy would be voted and in
accordance with the choice indicated by the security holder, 0 that the
floor on remuneration disclosures be raised from $20,000 to $25,000 per
annum, 41 and that indebtedness to the issuer and its subsidiaries of
directors, officers, nominees, and also their associates be disclosed,
unless it arose in the ordinary course of business or did not exceed
$1,000.42
The current Regulation X-14 still reflects the three-way treatment
first applied to proxy regulation by the former LA rules. To be sure,
the limited information requirements have been expanded considerably,
particularly the list of specifications under Schedule 14A. The security
holders communication provisions have been enlarged, an alternative
technique added by rule X-14A-8, and the fraud prohibition has been
elaborated upon. However, the basic approach remains the same and
represents normal growth toward enabling the security holder to act
more intelligently upon the matter for which his vote or consent is
sought.
COVERAGE
Section 14(a) has almost as its sole touchstone of application the
supra note 33, at 1). And a new exemption permitted solicitations through newspaper ad-
vertisements similar to the "tombstones" of Securities Act § 2(10) (b). The 1942 pro-
posal for amendments precipitated hearings on the revisions before a subcommittee on
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce in connection with a bill to
repeal the revisions, but no further action was taken by Congress. See 10 SEC ANN. REP.
51-2 (1944).
35. See Exchange Act Release No. 3998 (Oct. 10, 1947), announcing the proposed
revision, and Exchange Act Release No. 4037 (Dec. 17, 1947) reporting adoption of re-
visions.
36. Schedule 14A, present Item 7(a) (2). Reference hereinafter to the proxy rules
are to the present rules, unless otherwise indicated.
37. X-14A-6(b).
38. See Exchange Act Release No. 4114 (July 6, 1948), and No. 4185 (Nov. 5, 1948).
39. X-14A-4(d) (2).
40. X--14A-4(e).
41. Schedule 14A, Items 7(a) (1) and (2). See also Item 7(f).
42. Item 7(d) and the instruction that follows it.
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answer to the easy question, "is the security held by the person -olicited
registered on a national securities exchange?" If the security is regis-
tered on a national securities exchange, the proxy regulation applies,
unless the security is an "exempted security," a term used in Sec-
tion 14(a) itself, and defined in Section 3(a) (12) of the Exchange Act.
Neither Section 14(a) nor X-14A-3 limits its jurisdiction tosolicita-
tions by use of the mails or through interstate commerce or by the
facilities of a national securities exchange. 43 The regulation is applica-
ble only with respect to solicitations in respect of the particular class of
a company's securities which are listed. Non-listed 44 classes are not
covered and remain outside the regulation even if they are converti-
ble to listed securities. 45 Coverage vests when the security becomes
"listed," and this occurs when the registration application filed under
Section 12 of the Exchange Act becomes effective. Any solicitation
after the application has become effective is covered by X-14A-3; any
solicitation prior to the effectiveness is excluded. Until delisting IS has
become effective, there is coverage; afterwards there is none.
The coverage test is somewhat analogous with respect to companies
amenable to X-14A-3 by virtue of Section 12(e) of the Holding Com-
pany Act, and Section 20(a) of the Investment Company Act. Just as
43. Section 14(a) covers solicitations "by use of the mails or by any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of any national securities ex-
change or otherwise." X-14A-7(a) of Regulation X-14, as promulgated in 1938, ex-
empted solicitations other than through the mails, interstate commerce, or a national
exchange. The exemption was eliminated in the 1943 amendment of the regulation. See
note 34 supra. Constitutional questions may lurk in the phrase of Section 14(a) "or
otherwise." See Bernstein & Fischer, supra note 31, at 241.
44. A non-lsed security, one which is not listed or registered on any national se-
curities exchange, is not to be confused with an unlisted security. Unlislcd securities are
of three'types: (1) securities which have been admitted to unlisted trading privileges un-
der X-12F-1 et seq. on a particular national securities exchange because of having pre-
viously been listed and registered on another such exchange (the proxy rules are ap-
plicable as to these) ; (2) securities which were admitted to unlisted trading privileges
prior to the effective date of the Exchange Act, and are not listed or registered on any
national securities exchange (the proxy rules are not applicable to these by virtue of
X-12F-4(b)) ; and (3) securities which have been admitted to unlisted trading privileges
as a result of their continuing to be available from a registration statement and periodic
reports or other data filed under the Securities Act or the Exchange Act information
substantially equivalent to that available in respect of listed securities (the proxy rules
would be applicable to these). See § 12(f) of the Exchange Act.
45. On December 1, 1949, the Cleveland, St. Louis, and Minneapolis-St. Paul Stock:
Exchanges de-registered under Section 6 of the Exchange Act as a consequence of their
merger into the Chicago Stock Exchange, which survived and changed its name to the
Midwest Stock Exchange. Most companies registered on the non-surviving exchanges
re-registered pursuant to Section 12, on form 8-C, with the Midwest Stock Exchange.
A few, however, did not, and consequently their shares were delisted. Any solicitation for
proxies after December 1, 1949, in respect of shares of the delisted companies is outside
the scope of Section 14(a) and X-14A-3.
46. The Commission's rules concerning delisting are X-12D2-1 and 2.
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coverage under the Exchange Act parallels listing, coverage of an elec-
tric or gas public utility company parallels registration under the Hold-
ing Company Act. The same may be said of an investment company in
connection with Section 20(a) of the Investment Company Act. This
Act, however, raises a problem in regard to when an existing company
must register under the Act because it "proposes to engage" in invest-
ment company activities and therefore is bound by the proxy rules.
Reference to Section 3 (a) of the Investment Company Act will disclose
that in three subparagraphs it defines an investment company for pur-
poses of the Act. It will also be observed that each of the three subpara-
graphs, including Section 3 (a) (3) which prescribes a partially quantita-
tive test couched in terms of acquisition of "investment securities"
having a value exceeding 40 per cent of total assets, embraces not only
an existing investment company, but also a company that "proposes
to engage" in such activities. Consequently, a person undertaking to
organize a new company that "proposes to engage" in the investment
company business must initiate registration under Section 8 of the
Act before issuing any shares. It would also seem that an existing
company which intends to engage in new activities which will con-
stitute it an investment company necessarily "proposes to engage" in
investment company activities, and must immediately register under
Section 8. As an incident of registration the newly formed investment
company would of course be subject to the proxy requirements of
Section 20(a) and X-14A-3. It would seem to follow that the existing
company that "proposes to engage" in investment company activities
may also be covered by Section 2 0(a) and X-14A-3.47
47. Portsmouth Steel Corporation, which held certain investment securities, proposed
in November, 1949 to transfer its steel assets and coal subsidiaries to the Detroit Steel
Corporation for Detroit shares. As a result of the proposed acquisition of Detroit shares,
more than 40 per cent of Portsmouth's assets would consist of "investment securities" as
defined in the sentence following Section 3(a) (3). It therefore appeared that Ports-
mouth proposed to engage in an investment company business, and that registration under
Section 8 was required. Consequently, the proxy provisions of Section 20(a) and
X-14A-3 would appear to have been applicable to the solicitation by Portsmouth and Otis
& Co. (a registered broker-dealer, whose principals were also officers of Portsmouth) of
proxies in favor of the proposed entry of Portsmouth into the investment company field
and the resultant abandonment of its steel producing operations. Of course, it is often
extremely difficult to ascertain subjective purpose. But the facts that Portsmouth and
Otis & Co. solicited proxies in favor of the proposal, and that Portsmouth had consum-
mated negotiations with Detroit, indicated circumstantially what was proposed, and that
the result would be to constitute Portsmouth an investment company under Section
3(a) (3). It may be arguable whether the legislative purpose of the language "proposes
to engage" was to reach an existing as well as a new company. A question may also
arise as to whether a pleading directed to such a situation may properly charge viola-
tions of both the registration provisions of Section 8 and the proxy requirements of Sec-
tion 20(a) in view of the circumstances that the company, though required to register
under Section 8, is not literally a, "registered investment company" within the language
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In outlining the coverage of the regulations it is necessary to define
the scope of the term "solicitation." An interesting case involving this
question is SEC v. Okin.4s Okin, a shareholder in the Electric Bond and
Share Company, sent a letter to other security holders in which he did
not solicit a proxy but in which he requested these holders not to sign
any proxies for the company and to revoke any that they might already
have signed. At the time of the mailing of Okin's letter, X-14A-1(2),
defining "solicitation," did not expressly cover (as it has since the adop-
tion of the 1942 amendments) "any request to execute or not to exe-
cute, or to revoke, a proxy." 41 But the Commission argued, and the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed, that "[t]o say that
Okin's conduct did not involve the solicitation of proxies, consents, and
authorization would be to exalt form over substance." 11 The letter
"was a first step in an admitted program of requesting proxies." 51
Of course, even under the amended definition, an informal letter to
security holders, not accompanied by a proxy form and merely advising
them of the progress of the company and its affairs, is not a solicitation,
providing it is not used in anticipation of a possible proxy contest or
to forestall anticipated negative votes. 52 But the furnishing of a form
of proxy "under circumstances reasonably calculated to result in the
procurement of a proxy" is a solicitation under the e\press terms of the
of 20(a). However, if 20(a) is not charged the result may be to permit non-compliance
with the proxy regulation by a company who has violated the registration section. Even
if a 20(a) charge will not properly lie, it would seem that a Section 8 injunctive order
should include as a remedial device a provision enjoining any proxy solicitation not made
in compliance with the proxy regulation. See pages 669-70 infra. Little reason is apparent
for narrow interpretation. It is interesting to note that the proxy material disseminated
by Portsmouth and Otis & Co. fell far short of the standards of the Commission's proxy
regulation, and was, therefore, in sharp contrast to the material distributed by Detroit,
a listed company and therefore subject to the regulation. It will be interesting to observe
what further experience may be gained in connection with the solicitation of proxies in
favor of a plan, the effect of which is to change an existing company's operations to those
of an investment company within Section 3(a) of the Investment Company Act. See
Cleveland Press, Nov. 3, 1949, p. 29, col. 1, 2, and Jan. 3, 1950, p. 21, col. 1.
48. 132 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1943).
49. Cf. former Rule X-14A-8 and former Rule X-14A-9(b) (2). See also present
Rule X-14A-1 defining, inter alia, "solicitation," particularly clause (2) of the definition.
50. See Opening Brief for the SEC, p. 9.
51. SEC v. Okn, 132 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir. 1943). The circuit court made no
finding on the question whether under the circumstances Okin should have disclosed that he
'had acquired his 9,000 shares for $9,000, suggesting that "it may depend upon why he
bought his shares at the figure he did." The court also said, "We will not now decide
whether a person buying into a company, merely to become an officer, can never be re-
quired to disclose what stake he has in it, if he chooses to go out after proxies." SEC
v. Okin, 132 F.2d 784, 787 (2d Cir. 1943).
52. However, if there is no conduct which amounts to an invitation to security holders
to request proxies and any request received for a proxy form is a spontaneous and isolated
application, the furnishing of the form of proxy will not constitute a "solicitation."
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third clause of the X-14A-1 definition, unless the proxy is furnished,
as contemplated by the last sentence, "upon the unsolicited request"
of the security holder.
Whether any given activity is a "first step" in a solicitation appears
to depend under the Okin case upon the nature of the activity and the
activity proposed.13 If the activity should be followed by a proxy
solicitation there would seem to be an additional basis for holding the
activity to have been a "first step," and to have constituted a violation.
A box-type advertisement addressed to security holders and urging
formation of a stockholders committee; 11 a letter to shareholders ask-
ing their opinion on the advisability of forming a committee to select a
slate of candidates for directorship; or a similar letter seeking support
for, or opposing an amendment to the by-laws may be a "first step,"
and require compliance with the proxy regulations before use. It
should be noted, moreover, that, since "solicitation" is defined in terms
of "any request," either an oral or a written solicitation will constitute
a violation, if made prior to the Commission's authorization to mail
the proxy statement. 55
Exemptions from Coverage
Rule X-14A-2 affords seven specific exemptions from the coverage
provided in X-14A-3, and there are two additional exemptions found
elsewhere in the Exchange Act Rules. Both of the latter spring directly
from the statute itself. One, X-3A-12, makes somewhat clearer the
scope of the term "exempted security" appearing in Sections 14(a) and
3(a)(12) of the Act. This rule operates to exempt any solicitation of
proxies with respect to so-called "governments" and "municipals."
53. Cf. Securities Act Release No. 474 (Feb. 5, 1936), which discusses the conditions
under which a written communication constitutes a prospectus within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(10) of the Securities Act.
54. See Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 5, 1948, p. 12, col. 6-8 for ad pertaining to
Alleghany Corporation. For an example of a box type ad constituting a "first step"
in a solicitation of a proxy for the 1950 Kaiser-Frazer Corporation annual meeting and/or
a "first step" in a solicitation of a consent or authorization relating to a pending federal
court action against Kaiser-Frazer, see Detroit News, Jan. 17, 1950, p. 32, col. 7-9 (ad
captioned, "Open Letter to Kaiser-Frazer stockholders.")
55. It should be observed also that the saving sentence appended to the solicitation
definition, in addition to excepting the furnishing of a form of proxy to a security holder
upon his request and the performance of acts required by management by the mailing-
communications-for-security-holder provisions of X-14A-7, also excepts "the performance
by any person of ministerial acts." Examples of permissive ministerial acts are the mail-
ing of letters to stockholders merely announcing postponement of the meeting, change of




The other, X-12F-4(b), makes it plain that the proxy rules are not
applicable to solicitations in respect of unlisted securities. 13
The exemptions specifically provided by X-14A--2 are of four gen-
eral types. There is an exemption available to all but management; an
exemption for two special classes of security holders; an exemption for
two types of securities even though they are not an exempted security
as such, and, finally, a general exemption permitting a limited type of
solicitation through newspaper advertisements. 57
Interesting questions have been raised as to how one counts to ten
in connection with the X-14A-2(a) exemption for solicitations "other-
wise than on behalf of management . . . where the total number of
persons solicited is not more than ten." 5s Keen enthusiasm for the
exemption has sometimes impelled opposition groups to total each
time ten persons have been solicited, and to start anew. The more
sophisticated have suggested that each member of a non-management
soliciting group gets ten tries. Still others, apparently forgetting either
the abolition of the repealed exemption found in former Rule X-14A-
7(a), or the word "otherwise" contained in Section 14(a) itself, have
conceived that there is room under the rule for a "luncheon technique"
or other oral or written solicitation not involving a use of the mails,
instruments of interstate commerce, or a facility of a national securities
exchange. These are all delusions. The computation is actually as
easy as counting to ten, taking care to count, however, not merely each
person who gives his proxy, but each person who is solicited either
orally or in writing irrespective of whether he gives or refuses a proxy.
Similarly, a non-management group as a whole gets ten solicitations;
but the individual members of a given group do not each have ten
thrusts. Any attempt at concerted efforts to "divide and conquer,"
either through solicitations by several individual members of one group
or through the splitting up of a group into several groups, may be ex-
pected to be regarded as an overburdening of the exemption. While
nice questions continue to arise, the bona fides of the parties remains
the test, not only as to the computation aspect of the rule, but also as
to whether the solicitation claimed to be exempt is actually "otherwise
than on behalf of management."
Rules X-14A-2(b) and (c), broadly speaking, exempt solicitations
by a person in respect of securities carried in his name or in the name
of his nominee or held in his custody, or of which he is the beneficial
56. Of course, if the unlisted security is the security of a registered gas or eectric
utility holding company or its subsidiaries, or a security of a registered investment com-
pany, the proxy regulation would ngvertheless apply by force of Section 12(e) of the
Holding Company Act or 20 (a) of the Investment Company Act.
57. See X-14A-2(a), X-14A-2(b) and (c), X-14A-2(d) and (e), and X-14A-2(g).
58. In 1947, X-14A-2(a) increased to ten the nine solicitations previously con-
templated by X-14A-8, its predecessor. See note 35 supra.
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owner. These "personal" exemptions receive different treatment in the
sense that the exemption based on beneficial ownership is complete and
without qualification once the matter of beneficial ownership is deter-
mined, whereas the other personal exemptions are qualified in three
important particulars.
The matter of beneficial ownership presents difficult questions of fact,
but it is a question upon which some light has been shed by interpreta-
tions of Section 16(a) of the Exchange Act.69 That Section requires
that a "beneficial owner of more than 10 per cent of any class of any
equity security (other than an exempted security) which is registered
in a national securities exchange" report periodic changes in his bene-
ficial ownership. The principal problems encountered in determining
who are beneficial owners occur when legal title to securities is vested
in wives and other family members or in partnerships, corporations
(especially those used as personal holding companies or investment
mediums), and inter vivos, testamentary or other trusts. The Com-
mission has stated that if a person has benefits substantially equivalent
to ownership, or has the power to vest or revest ownership in himself,
he may be regarded as a beneficial owner of shares held in a husband's,
wife's, or other family member's name.', Again, the Commission has
stated that if one is a member of a partnership or interested in a cor-
poration which is an owner of voting securities, or a settlor, trustee, or
beneficiary of a trust similarly situated he may have beneficial owner-
ship.61 While these statements were made with reference to Sec-
tion 16(a), they are at least helpful in construing X-14A-2(c), if not
actually applicable by analogy. Thus a determination of beneficial
ownership may be a mixed blessing, for while the ownership reporting
requirement must then be considered, the X-14A-2(c) proxy exemp-
tion is gained.
The "personal" exemption which X-14A-2(b) affords solicitations
in respect of securities carried in the solicitor's name or in his nominee's,
contains an important qualification not present in the exemption for
securities held in the solicitor's custody, namely, that voting trustees
are precluded from the exemption through the parenthesis technique. 2
Some relief, however, may be available to voting trustees by the exemp-
tions afforded through Rules X-14A-2(d) through (f), which exempt
59. The term "equity security" used in Section 16(a) is defined in Section 3(a) (12)
of the Exchange Act. And see rules under Section 16(a), namely, X-16A-1 through
X-16A-7.
60. Exchange Act Release No. 175 (Class A) (April 16, 1935).
61. Exchange Act Release No. 1965 (Dec. 21, 1938).
62. X-14A-2(b) affords an exemption for "any solicitation by a person in respect
of securities carried in his name or in the name of his nominee (otherwise than as voting
trustee) or held in his custody. ..."
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certain solicitations involving securities subject to the Securities Act,
Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, or the Holding Company Act.
Apart from the voting trustee problem, there are three qualifications
to the availability of the "personal" exemption afforded with regard
to securities carried in a solicitor's name, or in his nominee's name, or
held in his custody. Parenthetically, it should be noted that, while not
so limited, the exemption was probably cast with an eye on the circum-
stance that a great many securities are carried in the name of broker-
dealers or in "street form" for the accounts of customers. Thus the
exemption complements the proxy rules of the New York and other
national securities exchanges. 6 And the exemption also recognizes
that other registered owners whose names appear on the issuer's
transfer books may be nominees, or even a nominee of a nominee ad
infinitum. The first of the three limitations on the exemption dis-
qualifies certain paid solicitors. But by virtue of its modifying clause
such solicitors are disqualified only if the commission or remuneration
received by them is given other than for reimbursement of "reasonable
expenses." As in the instance of the "exchange" exemption contained
in Section 3(a) (9) of the Securities Act, neither the X-14A-2(b) nor
the 3(a)(9) exemption is lost, if otherwise available, merely because
the paid solicitor is paid and is a solicitor. The term "reasonable ex-
penses" contemplates merely mailing, out-of-pocket, and kindred
sundry expense items. The second limitation provides for transmis-
sion of proxy soliciting material and requires the solicitor, if requested,
to defray the expenses of transmitting the material. It again has par-
ticular reference to the proxy rules of the various national securities
exchanges. The third limitation simply requires that the transmitter
shall not himself engage in any solicitation as such. Thus his function
is confined to that of transmitting the material he has received from an
actual solicitor of the proxy.
Since a solicitation incident to the filing of a Securities Act registra-
tion statement, a plan of reorganization under the corporate reorganiza-
tion provisions of Chapter X, or a Holding Company Act application
and declaration is accomplished under the jurisdiction and supervision
of either the Commission, a federal court, or both, they have been
exempted by X-14A-2(d) through (f). The protection afforded by the
various statutes and applicable regulations is considered to obviate
any need for further controls through the proxy regulation.
The final exemption, X-14A-2(g), permits the use of certain news-
paper advertisements in a solicitation. Without the rule it would be
practically impossible to solicit through the medium of a newspaper
advertisement for it would be necessary to print an entire proxy state-
ment, a prohibitive expense in most instances. The exemption has as
63. See note 18 supra.
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its counterpart the so-called "tombstone" exception found in the
Securities Act Section 2(10)(b) definition of the term "prospectus."
Like the "tombstone" exception, so-called because of the brief scope
of the permitted statement, the proxy "tombstone" exception limits
the contents of the advertisement to one which "does no more than
(1) name the issuer, (2) state the reasons for the advertisement, and
(3) identify the proposal or proposals to be acted upon by the security
holders."
The "tombstone" advertisement will necessarily be brief. Both the
Securities Act and the proxy "tombstone" have been criticized on this
count, especially since the three permissive items of the "tombstone"
are ordinarily interpreted by the Commission to permit little more than
identification of the general type found on their namesakes. However, a
nationally known investment banking house recently conducted a
survey which showed that an amazingly large percentage of readers of
newspaper financial pages read and even remember the material carried
in "tombstones," apparently because of their brevity. 4 Nevertheless,
on the basis of preliminary discussions concerning the amendment of
Section 2(10) (b) of the Securities Act, it appears that an expansion of
its "tombstone" requirements is possible, 5 with perhaps a subsequent
broadening of the proxy "tombstone" provisions."8
INFORMATION REQUIRED FROMf COMPANIES SUBJECT TO REGULATION
Rule X-14A-3 provides that if companies subject to the act solicit
proxies, they must, either concurrently with the solicitation or at a
previous time, furnish security holders a proxy statement containing
the information specified in Schedule 14A. The rule also requires such
companies to provide security holders, in certain instances, with an
annual report containing financial statements.
More specifically, X-14A-3(b) requires that an annual report con-
64. Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 10, 1948, p. 15, col. 6. The survey was conducted
by Lehman Brothers.
65. See Securities Act Release Nos. 3188 and 3244 (Jan. 17, 1947 and June 6, 1947,
respectively).
66. A point commonly overlooked is that the proxy "tombstone" involves a sollcita-
tion within the meaning of the X-14A-1 definition of "solicitation." The "tombstone" is
required, moreover, by the exemption's introductory language to inform "security holders
of a source from which they may obtain copies of a proxy statement, form of proxy, and
any other soliciting material." The solicitor employing the "tombstone" must, therefore,
necessarily have a proxy, proxy statement, and other material, if any, available. Conse-
quently, he must have first filed with the Commission and obtained its authorization to
use his materials before his advertisement is published. Thus a security holder who has
merely availed himself of the security holder proposal provisions of X-14A-8 and/or
who has not filed a proxy statement cannot avail himself of the proxy "tombstone" ex-




taining financial statements must either precede or accompany a
management proxy statement relating to an "annual meeting" 1 of
security holders at which directors are to be elected. An opposition
group, however, is not required to transmit an annual report or finan-
cials. Therefore, before the regulation was amended, an opposition
group was able to start soliciting in favor of its slate of nominees,
pursuant to its proxy statement, while management was waiting for its
financials to be completed. By an amendment effective February 1,
1945, 6s the substance of the last sentence of the present rule X-14A-
3(b) was added. The amendment permits management to solicit in
advance of the availability of financials, if a solicitation is being made
in opposition to management, provided that management's proxy
statement includes an undertaking in bold-face type to furnish at least
twenty days before the date of the meeting an annual report, with
financials, to all persons solicited.
Occasionally the subject matter of a particular solicitation permits
opposition groups to solicit proxies before management can prepare
its proxy material even though neither annual reports nor financials
are required of management. Various suggestions were received by
the Commission in 1948 following the announcement of its proposal
to amend the proxy rules with respect to this matter.o Among the
suggestions was one to permit management to publish statements in
response to solicitations in opposition before its material was ready.
It was also proposed that management be allowed to omit from its
proxy material any information not available at the time the solicita-
67. The requirement pertaining to annual reports was qualified by the amendments
adopted on December 17, 1947, and effective on February 15, 1948, to apply to an "annual"
meeting. See Exchange Act Release No. 4037 (Dec. 17, 1947). Until the amendment,
the rule required the sending of an annual report prior to special meetings 'where, for
example, only one or two directors were to be elected to fill vacancies.
68. See Exchange Act Release No. 3652 (Feb. 1, 1945), and compare the former
X-14A-1 (b) with the present X-14A-3 (b). It will also be noted that under X-14A--3 (b)
it is not necessary, as it was until the 1947 amendments, that annual reports sent by man-
agement in advance of its proxy statement contain a statement that proxies will be re-
quested later. Compare the third last sentence of former X-14A-1(b) with present
X-14A-3 (b).
69. See Exchange Act Release No. 4114 (July 6, 1948), captioned "Notice of Pro-
posal to Amend Proxy Rules." Since both the 1947 and 1948 proposals by the Commis-
sion for amendment contemplated certain expansions of the regulation's requirements, and
were not confined to relieving restrictions, the proposals were both subject to the public
notice requirements of Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946. 60 STAT.
238, 5 U.S.C. § 1003 (1946). Before this act, however, the Commission had made a prac-
tice of publicly announcing its proposals to change its rules. See Exchange Act Release
No. 2376 (Jan. 12, 1940), which indicates that the Commission had also circulated its 1940
proposed amendments to the various national securities exchanges, to interested members
of the bar and financial community, and to a number of professional organizations con-
cerned with problems of corporate management.
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tion is begun by the opposition." Beyond this it was suggested that
where the opposition has begun soliciting, the rules should be amended
to reduce the ten-day waiting period.'
None of the three suggestions has been adopted. Adoption of the
first two would practically result in the management's solicitation be-
ing virtually accomplished before all the facts pertinent to its solicita-
tion had been filed with the Commission or made available to security
holders. If this were to happen, it would be in conflict with the Rules'
main purpose of affording adequate information to security holders.
The third suggestion, that the waiting period be shortened, apparently
ignores the closing words of X-14A-6(a) which provides for accelera-
tion of the expiration of the waiting period by the Commission where
good cause is shown. The rule establishes a procedure for meeting
special situations which is more flexible and presumably more practical
than a rigid rule. The Commission's practice, moreover, has been to
grant acceleration freely where there is a contest.7 2
The first and second sentences of X-14A-3(b) require only that
financial statements furnished security holders by management shall
"in the opinion of management, adequately reflect the financial posi-
tion and operations of the issuer." Financial statements, moreover,
like the annual report, "may be in any form deemed suitable by the
management." Consequently, the Commission's accounting rules,"
governing the form and content of financial statements, are not ap-
plicable to financials disseminated in connection with proxy solicita-
tions relating to annual meetings at which directors are to be elected.
Similarly, the annual reports need not meet the standards prescribed
by the Commission for annual reports required to be filed under Sec-
tion 13(a) of the Exchange Act, Section 14 of the Holding Company
Act, or Section 30(a) of the Investment Company Act. Indeed, the
only affirmative requirement of X-14A-3(b) in regard to financials
and annual reports used in connection with proxy solicitations is that
they relate to the "last fiscal year." 71
70. While X-14A-5(b) permits subject matter, which from a standpoint of practical
necessity must be determined in the future to be stated in terms of present knowledge and
intention, and also permits information not known, and not reasonably ascertainable or
procurable, to be omitted if a brief statement is made of the circumstances rendering the
information unavailable, the rule is not regarded as applicable merely because manage-
ment's material is not yet ready.
71. The ten-day waiting period is provided for in Rule X-14A-6 (a).
72. See address by former Commissioner Robert K. McConnaughey before the
American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc., at the Harvard Club, Neew York, N.Y.,
Nov. 10, 1948, pp. 10-11.
73. Regulation S-X. Revision of this regulation is currently being given preliminary
consideration by the Office of the Commission's Chief Accountant and by interested
certified and public, independent accountants.
74. X-14A-3(b), first sentence. A definition of the term "last fiscal year" was
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In addition to prescribing the time within which the management's
annual report and financials must be filed with the Commission, X-14A-
3(c) provides that these materials "shall be mailed to the Commission,
solely for its information," and that they are "not deemed to be 'solicit-
ing material' or to be 'filed' with the Commission or otherwise subject
to this regulation or to the liabilities of Section 18 of the Act." " While
the saving language is subject to two narrow exceptions, its general
effect is to exculpate the annual report and its financials from the anti-
fraud provision of X-14A-9. The rule not only spares management
from anti-fraud action by the Commission, but it also excludes man-
agement from the civil liability and recovery provisions afforded in-
vestors by Section 18 of the Act. While exclusion from X-14A-3 has
some precedent based on the Securities Act exemptions from its regis-
tration requirements,- there is no similar precedent for exclusion
from fraud. The congressional grant of rule-making power to the
Commission by Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act does not require
any exclusion from fraud. None of the legislation administered by
the Commission affords exemptions from fraud, except through cer-
tain purely jurisdictional exclusions in coverage sections. Although
the X-14A-3(c) fraud exclusions appeared in the regulation for the
first time in the 1947 amendments, the policy reflected is not new.
They represent codification into the regulation of an administrative
interpretation first announced on February 5, 194 3.7 This administra-
tive interpretation was the ultimate result of one of the amendments
proposed by the Commission in 1942. The effect of the amendment
added to X-14A-1 by the 1948 amendments in order to make it more clear that the fiscal
year referred to in X-14A-3(b) and elsewhere in the regulation is the last fiscal year
of the issuer ending prior to the date of the meeting for which proxies are to be solicited.
See Exchange Act Release Nos. 4114 and 4185 (July 6, 1948 and Nov. 5, 1948). The
purpose of both X-14A-3 (b) and X-14A-1 is to provide the security holder vAth rea-
sonably current financial statements when they are required by the regulation. Financials
covering a preceding fiscal year would commonly result in information so dated as to be
practically useless.
In connection with its 1949 proxy solicitation, Affiliated Gas Equipment, Inc., of
Cleveland, Ohio, considered as adequate financials contained in its January 13, 1949, pro-
spectus filed under Section 10 of the Securities Act. Pursuant to Rule X-12B--35(a)
and (b), the company included the financials in its April, 1949, Form 10 filed under Sec-
tion 12 of the Exchange Act. The prospectus was incorporated by reference in the pres-
ident's letter accompanying the proxy statement. However, the company undertook
actually to deliver the prospectus containing the financials to stockholders who responded
to the reference in the president's letter by requesting a copy. See 1949 proxy statement
and material filed with SEC by Affiliated Gas Equipment, Inc. Photocopies of this and
other proxy filings may be obtained from the Commission's Washington, D.C. olice at the
photocopying rates prescribed in Rule 121(a) under the Securities Act.
75. X-14A-3(c), first sentence.
76. Compare Section 3(a), 4, and 17(c), uith Section 17(a).
77. Exchange Act Release No. 3380 (Feb. 5. 1943).
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would have been to require that all proxy statements relating to an-
nual reports contain financial statements meeting the accounting
requirements of Regulation S-X. The administrative interpretation
followed a wave of adverse criticism culminating in congressional
hearings concerning the Commission's proposed amendments."
The two exceptions contained in X-14A-3(c) are as follows: one
assures management of the fraud exemption, unless it specifically
"requests" that it be subject to the fraud provisions and the other in
effect warns management to take care in employing incorporations by
reference in its proxy material lest it be deemed to have indirectly
requested that it be compelled to satisfy the anti-fraud requirements.
Obviously, the careful corporation or securities lawyer prepares and
examines management proxy material with an eye on X-14A-3(c). It
should, however, be said in fairness to the rule that its exemptions from
fraud may not be as broad as they seem. The nature of a given item
of business at an annual meeting at which directors are to be elected
may well be such that it is very difficult in a contest to avoid language
constituting an incorporation by reference in management proxy
soliciting material which is "filed" with the Commission. Such lan-
guage would, of course, subject management and its solicitors to ad-
ministrative, criminal, or civil liability for fraud.7"
Informational Requirements of Schedule z4A
The lack of substantive content in X-14A-6 is explained by the com-
prehensive requirements of Schedule 14A which detail the information
required in a proxy statement. s° Essentially the schedule has four parts:
Items 1 through 5 specifying informational requirements applicable to
proxy statements generally; Item 6 pertaining to the election of di-
rectors; Items 8 through 21 dealing with various additional proposed
78. Exchange Act Release No. 3347 (Dec. 18, 1942).
79. With a view to avoiding incorporation, references to the annual report in the
proxy statement sometime include language to the effect that the annual report is not a
part of the proxy statement. See 1949 Parke Davis & Co. proxy statement.
Financials contained in annual reports, although commonly condensed considerably,
are frequently the result of an independent audit by certified or public accountants and
may be covered by an auditor's certificate. Thus the ultimate responsibility for false or
misleading statements in the financials would in any event rest with the accounting fra-
ternity. This circumstance would serve to spare management from liability based on the
financials to the extent that they rely on their accountants, and would leave management
liable only for its own acts for which they must expect to assume responsibility. The
portions of the annual report, other than the financials, should present few problems,
They consist ordinarily of the perennial president's letter, and descriptive information of
the company's product and business, all matter well within the fair responsibility of
management.
80. Structurally, Schedule 14A is incorporated into the regulation by the coverage
rule. See X-14A-3 (a).
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action; and Item 7 calling for remuneration data in connection with
solicitations relating to certain items of contemplated business. Each
item requires in effect that a certain minimum of information be given
to security holders in connection with the solicitation of proxies anal-
ogous to the registration requirements of the Securities Act.8'
The information requirements of Items 1 through 5 may be sum-
marized generally as comprehending disclosures regarding revocability
of the proxy,82 dissenters' rights of appraisal, 3 identity of the actual
solicitor and the source of the funds used to pay the costs of solicita-
tion, interest of the solicitor and others, 4 and ownership of voting
securities.8 5 Item 6, which specifies the information required in connec-
tion with an election of directors, merits, however, more than passing
attention, if for no other reason than because nearly 90 per cent of all
proxy statements filed during a typical year, 1947, involved an election
of directors."' While the requirement of Item 6(a) embracing names of
nominees and the duration of the term for which they are nominated
is clear enough, portions of its import are not so obvious. For example,
if less than the authorized number of directors is nominated, the reason
for so proceeding should be stated.8 Furthermore, if proxies are
solicited to vote upon the classification of directors under a plan pro-
81. See Securities Act § 7, and Schedule A. See also Commission's statement of
purpose in Exchange Act Release No. 1350 (Aug. 13, 1947).
82. In effect Item 1 calls for information as to whether under the applicable law
the proxy may be revoked, and the extent of any limitations upon revocation. Where, as
in some states, revocation is dependent upon conformance with a specified statutory pro-
cedure, a specific statement of the procedure to be followed should be included in the
proxy statement. See, e.g., OHio GEN. CoDE §8623-53 (Page, Supp. 1949).
83. See Item 2 which is especially applicable where statutory mergers, consolidations,
or transfers of assets are involved. Approximately 33 states have statutes affording dis-
senters appraisal rights in such situations. BALLANTIIn, Coesonvo, s 700 (1946). See
also Items 14 and 15. A letter or other solicitation urging dissenters to claim statutory
appraisal rights is a solicitation of consent or authorization, and therefore a solicitation
of a proxy, unless the applicable state statute requires the soliciting person to give
notice and/or take the proposed action.
84. Item 4, in general, calls for information in connection with any matter to be
acted upon other than elections to office, concerning "any substantial interest" direct or
indirect (by security holdings or otherwise) of any of the following persons: (1) di-
rectors or officers, or the solicitor, if he is not acting in behalf of management, (2)
nominees for directorships, or (3) associates of any of the foregoing. Formerly the
item (designated Item 5(H)), reached "any interest," which was interpreted in Exchange
Act Release No. 3385 (Feb. 17, 1943) to mean "any material interest."
85. Item 5, in addition to requiring in paragraph (d) information as to ownership of
voting securities by more than 10 per cent owners, also encompasses data as to the num-
ber of voting securities outstanding and the number of votes they carry, the record date
for purposes of eligibility to vote, and cumulative voting with respect to election of di-
rectors.
86. See 14 SEC Axx. REP. 38 (1948).
87. Cf. Rule X-14A-4(d) (1) providing that no proxy may confer authority to
vote for the election of any person to any office for which a bona fide nominee is not
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viding for terms of more than one year, the proxy statement must
contain an explicit statement as to whether in filling vacancies occur-
ring during the year, the directors are authorized to appoint directors
for the remainder of the year.s Similarly, Item 6(b) pertaining to dis-
closure of an "arrangement or understanding" fdr election to office
existing between a nominee and persons other than an officer or di-
rector acting solely in his official capacity, presents problems as to
what constitutes a nominee a party to an "arrangement or understand-
ing." If a nominee is proposed to be elected pursuant to an arrange-
ment primarily between the issuer or its management, on the one
hand, and one or more third persons, on the other, the nominee is
deemed to be a party to the arrangement or undertaking, for it is un-
likely that he is being nominated without his knowledge of and consent
to the arrangement or understanding. 9 However, an arrangement for
election incident to a contract for the nominee's regular employment
with the issuer is within the exception afforded arrangements or under-
standings between a nominee and directors or officers acting in their
official capacity with respect to the employment agreement2 ° The
remainder of Item 6 11 is generally self-explanatory. 2
named. Consequently, the failure to name a nominee for a vacancy may result in the
unopposed election of an opposition group's nominee.
88. The statement should also indicate whether the appointment power seats the
director for a term which extends beyond the date of the next security holders' meeting,
or is limited to the portion of the term falling between the appointment and the next
annual meeting.
89. Where a person is to be put on the board pursuant to an arrangement or un-
derstanding entered into at some time in the past, it should be described if it continues to
be operative with respect to the current nomination. It is common for underwriters to
condition their underwriting of a public offering of securities upon, inter alia, their right
to designate for inclusion in a management slate, a nominee for elcction to the board.
See, for example, prospectus covering securities registered pursuant to Section 5 of the
Securities Act issued by Roosevelt Oil & Refining Corporation on July 14, 1948 (cover
page and page 18), and prospectus covering securities offered as exempt under Section
3(b) and Regulation A of the Act issued by H. D. Smith Manufacturing Corporation
on May 3, 1949 (cover page and page 6).
90. See 1948 Howell Electric Company proxy soliciting material.
91. The term "associate" defined in Rule X-14A-1 and used in Items 4(d), 6(c)(4),
7(d) (4) (iii), 7(e) (3), 7(f) (4), 8, and 11(e), is given a triple effect for purposes of
the regulation. In general, it reaches not only certain natural persons through clause (3)
of X-14A-1, but also specified corporations and organizations (exclusive of the issuer in
respect of which the proxy is solicited and its majority-owned subsidiaries) through
clause (1) and designated trusts and estates through clause (2). Clause (1) sets up an
officer or ownership test for corporations and organizations measured in terms of the
holding of an office or having a partnership interest or owning a beneficial interest in
10 per cent or more of any class of equity security. The terms "majority-owned sub-
sidiary," "officer," and "equity security" are defined in X-12B-2, X-3B-2, and Exchange
Act § 3 (a) (11), respectively.
Whether a trust or estate is an "associate" of a person within the meaning of clause
(2) depends upon whether the person (a) has a "substantial beneficial interest" in the
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Information in regard to remuneration of directors, officers, and
certain others, and in regard to certain transactions between them and
the issuer or its subsidiaries is required by Items 7 (remuneration),
9 (bonus and profit-sharing plans), 10 (pension and retirement plans),93
and 11 (plans embracing options, warrants, or rights).
If any matters are to be considered within the ambit of Items 9
through 11, or within Item 6 (election of directors),0 4 the proxy state-
ment must contain information responsive to Item 7. This item com-
trust, or (b) serves as a trustee or in a "similar fiduciary capacity." In determining what
constitutes "substantial beneficial interest" reference to the discussion in SEC Exchange
Act Release Nos. 175 (Class A) (April 16, 1935) and 1965 (Dec. 21, 1939) regarding
"beneficial ownership," and SEC Exchange Act Release No. 3385 (Feb. 17, 1943) re-
lating to "interest" may be helpful.
Clause (3) defines as an associate "any relative or spouse... having the same
home!' The term "relative" includes not only a blood relative but also a relative by
marriage, for a mother-in-law "having the same home" has been deemed a relative and
therefore an associate. See 1949 Monarch Machine Tool Co. proxy statement. However,
the definition does not reach every "close family relationship," for the 1947 proposal to
so broaden the definition was not adopted. See SEC Exchange Act Release Nos. S99S
(Oct. 10, 1947) and 4037 (Dec. 17, 1947).
92. While Item 6(c) (1) actually calls for a statement of the principal business of a
nominee's employer, a statement of the principal business of the issuer is unnecessary,
since it may be assumed that the security holders are av.-are of that fact. See 1948 Mid-
land Steel Products Co. proxy statement. Insofar as Item 6(c) (3) and (4) entail
consideration of what constitutes "beneficial ownership," reference may be made to the
SEC Exchange Act Releases under § 16(a). In connection with Item 6(c) (3) a com-
pany undertaling an August 1948 solicitation used June 30, 1948, as the "most recent
practicable date" for stating beneficial ownership. The stockholders' meeting was fixed
for October 20, 1948, or three months and 20 days after the selected date. See 1948
Motor Products Corp. proxy statement.
93. Since the autumn of 1949 the application of Item 10 has broadened far beyond
the consideration of plans to afford directors, officers, and salaried employees additional
remuneration. Pension plans won for non-salaried industrial workers by organized labor
are within the orbit of this item. The controversial cost aspect of such plans has been
considered in the context of Item 10(b). As a result, the recent Bethlehem Steel
Corporation proxy statement carried an estimate of the average annual payments by the
company under the plan, assuming its continuance. Such an estimate is required even
though the company may have the right to terminate the plan at will or after a specified
period. In such a situation the proxy statement also should include the estimated cost
which would be imposed on the company if the plan were currently funded for past
services. Anticipated tax benefits may be indicated. In all instances the basis for the
estimates should be given. See also the United States Steel Corporation and A. 1f. Beyers
Company 1950 proxy statements. Accounting aspects of employees' pensions are discussed
in 13 SEC AwN. REP. 128-9 (1947).
94. In the case of unincorporated, management investment companies, shareholders'
action in voting upon a new management contract, or a renewal, pursuant to which the
manager performs the functions usually performed by a board of directors of an in-
corporated investment company is in effect an election of directors and Item 7 is therefore
applicable. See any proxy statement of National Securities and Research Corp, First
Mutual Trust Fund, or Independence Fund.
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prises six paragraphs, 95 but space limits this Article to a consideration
of only a few of the problems arising thereunder. Questions arise under
Item 7(a) (viz., relating to remuneration of directors) with reference to
so-called "deferred compensation plans" for the benefit of directors,
officers, 6 and others. These plans provide generally that upon retire-
ment of a director, officer, or other participant, he or his estate will
receive a fixed amount annually for a specified number of years and
that in return for the payments, he shall be available, throughout his
lifetime, for consultation services. The estimated costs of these benefits
should ordinarily be accrued periodically prior to retirement, and the
amounts periodically accrued should, therefore, be disclosed in response
to Item 7. Also, although the payment of nominal group insurance
premiums need not be disclosed in Column 5 of Item 7(a) due to the
difficulties of makihg computations,97 estimates based on participation
to the retirement age at present salary should be furnished in respect of
pension or retirement plans.9
Remuneration 91 paid to a firm of which a director is a partner is of
special interest to lawyers who have undertaken to serve as a director
as well as to act as counsel for a client. The instruction to Item 7 (a)
permits a statement of the total amount paid to a partnership in lieu
of a statement of the proportionate share of the director or officer, pro-
vided it is indicated in a footnote or otherwise that this procedure has
been followed. It is not intended by the instruction, however, that the
95. Items 7(a) and (b) are applicable to receipt of remuneration as fees, salaries,
commissions, bonuses, shares in profits, pensions, retirement and similar plans: Item
7(c), to receipt of remuneration in the form of securities, options, warrants, rights, or
other property, or through their exercise or disposition; Item 7(d), to remuneration In
the form of indebtedness to the issuer; and Item 7(e), to remuneration from a "material
interest" received in "any significant transactions." Item 7(f) (1) through (4) calls
for remuneration information as to payments to certain affiliates, voting trustees of the
issuer's securities, more than 10 per cent owners, and associates of such voting trustees
or security holders, or any director or nominee, or of any officer specified in Item 7(b).
Note the $25,000 floor contained in Item 7(a) and (f).
96. The term "officer" is defined in X-3B-2;. and see Colby v. Klune, CCI' FED.
Sac. LAw RaP. 190,474 (2d Cir. 1949) ; Exchange Act Release No. 2687 (Nov. 16, 1940).
97. These payments need not be disclosed provided the amount of insurance coverage
is nominal, for example, under $5,000. If the group insurance is over $5,000, a note to
the Item 7(a) table that the designated persons are covered by group insurance, and
giving the amount of the coverage is apparently sufficient without reference to the
premiums.
98. These estimates may be footnoted to the effect that part of the sum is attributable
to the employees' own contributions, if that is the fact. See SEC Exchange Act Release
No. 3385, 3-4 (Feb. 17, 1943). See also 1949 Dresser Industries, Inc., proxy statement.
99. Brokers', accountants', and engineers' fees are also remuneration within the mean-
ing of the Item. Where an issuer sells a product through others the commissions paid are
remuneration, if title does not pass from the issuer to the marketing person or agent.
Percentage bonuses for services rendered during the "last fiscal year" which are not
payable until after the close of the fiscal year, should be included as "paid or set aside."
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total remuneration paid the firm must be included either in the individ-
ual remuneration of any director or officer who is required to be named,
or in the total remuneration shown for all directors and officers as a
group' 00
Item 7(c) (securities, etc., as remuneration) and 7(d) (indebtedness
to issuer as remuneration) have significant implications from the
standpoint of the recapture provisions of Section 16(b) for the reason
that a gain subject to recapture is viewed as "remuneration" and as
"indebtedness" within the meaning of the items. A director or officer
who has realized within six months a so-called "short-swing" profit
may have obtained the gain either "from the issuer . . . in the form
of securities," or from others as a result of trading. °10 In the interest of
avoiding the precipitation of litigation, the Cofiimission does not re-
quire a specific reference to Section 16(b) as such. It is sufficient in the
instance of profits from options, warrants or rights, to disclose the
name of the officer, or director, the dates of the transaction, and a
statement of the facts necessary to compute profits. However, if the
profit realized resulted from transactions in securities other than
options, warrants or rights, that is to say, from trading, additional data
is required. Such data must include a statement that the profit is re-
coverable by the company, and indicate whether the company intends
to initiate action. 02
100. If the total amount paid the partnership exceeds $25,000, the name of the firm and
the amount received must be disclosed under Item 7(f), but in such case no reference need
be made in the response to Item 7(a) to the data given under Item 7(f). If, on the other
band, the amount paid the partnership does not exceed P25,000, but the aggregate remuner-
ation of the director or officer including the payment to the partnership, does exceed
$25,000, the answer to Item 7(a) should be footnoted to show the name of the partner-
ship, the amount paid, and the nature of the services for which the payment was made.
In those cases in which the remuneration of the director or officer, including the total
amount paid the partnership, does not exceed $25,000, it is sufficient to furnish the data
reached by Item 7(e) in regard to transactions between the issuer and the partnership.
It will also be noted that Instruction 2 requires that the total amount paid to the firm
be included in determining whether or not a director or officer received remuneration in
excess of the $25,000 figure in Item 7. However, if the only remuneration paid in addi-
tion to the payment to the partnership is nominal directors' fees, the latter need not be
included in the computation to determine whether Item 7(a) is applicable to the officer
or director. But if the partnership or other recipient of remuneration is reimbursed for
expenses incurred, the total payment, and not merely the fee itself, must be compared
with the $25,000 figure.
101. Under the instruction to Item 7(d) short-swing trading resulting in profits of
$1,000 or less may be excluded.
102. See 1949 National Gypsum Co. proxy statement. Item 7(e) contains two phrases
in particular which present definition problems. They are, "material interest" and "ordi-
nary course of business." For an interpretation of "material interest" see SEC Exchange
Act Release No. 3385 (Feb. 17, 1942). The phrase "ordinary course of business" presents
specialized questions of fact and is dealt with on a case by case basis. If "ordinary course
of business" problems concern matters of confidential nature see Rule X-24B--2 affording
confidential treatment to such information filed with the Commission.
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Items 12 through 15 may conveniently be considered together, since
the financial statements called for by Item 15 must be furnished in con-
nection with the authorization or issuance of securities otherwise than
for exchange, the modification or exchange of securities, or the effecting
of mergers, consolidations and transfers of assets within the meaning
of Items 12, 13, and 14, respectively. Although the three individual
items present frequently recurring problems and provide for specially
prescribed data, the provisions of Item 15 requiring financials are
probably of greatest importance.'03 The most significant aspect of the
requirement of Item 15 with respect to financial statements is the con-
trast that it affords with the provisions of X-14A-3 (c) regarding the
financials furnished in annual reports incident to the election of di-
rectors. Unlike the latter rule which permits financials "deemed suit-
able by the management," Item 15 calls for balance sheet and profit
and loss information which must substantially meet the standards for
form and content of financial statements prescribed by Regulation
S-X. 0 4 If, however, the financials contained in the annual report (sent
to security holders because an election of directors is also an item of
business) are prepared substantially in accordance with the standards
of Regulation S-X, as modified by Item 15, they may be incorporated
by reference under the express provisions of Item 15 (d). Some latitude
from the general requirements of Item 15 is obtained by paragraph (c),
which permits omission of financials "not material for the exercise of
prudent judgment in regard to the matter to be acted upon." The
final sentence of the paragraph defines the quoted phrase to include
"the usual case . . . involving the authorization or issuance of com-
mon stock, otherwise than in exchange," but makes it clear that if the
authorization or issuance of senior securities is involved financials are
for obvious reasons required.0 5
The remaining items of Schedule 14A, Items 8 and 16 through 21,
relate to selection of auditors; "I acquisition or disposition of property;
103. During the typical year of 1947 a total of 292, or 17 per cent, of the proxy state-
ments filed concerned proposals within the scope of Items 12, 13, or 14. 13 SEC ANN.
REP. 39 (1947).
104. If the proposal is one within the scope of Item 14(b), the financials, however,
need not be certified, but must otherwise meet the balance sheet and profit and loss re-
quirements of Regulations S-X. Schedules, other than schedules of supplementary profit
and loss information, may also be omitted. See Items 15(a) and 15(b).
105. Where the action proposed is a stock-split, or a change from no par to par value
stock, financials are not required. The proxy statement need carry only a summary of
the equity section of the balance sheet on an "as is" and "pro-forma" basis. See 1948
McCord Corporation and Union Investment Company proxy statements.
106. Item 8, dealing with the selection of auditors, recognizes the practice in many
jurisdictions of submitting to stockholders the matter of choosing outside accountants to
prepare the annual audit. See 13 SEC ANN. RE,. 39 (1948); SEC v. Transamerica
Corporation, 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir., 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948).
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restatement of accounts; action with respect to reports; 10r matters
submitted to stockholders although not so required; "I amendment of
the charter, by-laws, or other documents; I0' and the manner of stating
all other items of business to be submitted to the security holders.110
Form, Content and Filing of tie Prox-y Statement
The form, content, and mechanics of filing the proxy statement and
other soliciting material is dealt with in X-14A-4, X-14A-5 and
X-14A-6. Certain paragraphs of these three Rules, however, touch on
related substantive matters of considerably more than mere formal
significance. For example, X-14A-4(a) (1) requires that the form of
proxy must indicate in bold face type whether or not the proxy is
solicited on behalf of management. Prior to the adoption of the 1948
amendments, it had not always been clear that a given solicitation was
not being conducted on behalf of management. To avoid the possibility
of misleading security holders, the amendment was adopted to require
that the form of proxy carry a bold-face, identifying legend, and a
companion amendment was adopted with respect to the proxy state-
ment in order that it, too, would be clearly identified.' The require-
ment of X-14A-4(a) (1) is, of course, literally satisfied by including in a
management proxy a bold-face legend reading "Management Proxy"
107. Since Item 18 refers specifically to "any report of the issuer or of its directors,
officers, or committees or any minutes of meeting of its stockholders," questions arise as
to when the item requires information where action is to be taken with respect to min-
utes. The item is only applicable when action approving the minutes amounts to ratifi-
cation of action reported in the minutes. Exchange Act Release No. 461 (Jan. 21,
1936).
108. Item 19 requires that the "reasons for submitting" be explained, and it also re-
quires statements detailing "the general effect of such submission!' and "the effect of a
negative vote on the matter." The "effect of a negative vote" entails a statement as to
whether management intends to be bound by stockholders' disapproval. It will also be
observed that Item 19 may "overlap" Items 8 through 18 and 20. However, if an item
reached by any of the latter is voluntarily submitted to stockholders by management,
Item 19 may be disregarded.
109. Where corporate by-laws or codes of regulations incorporate state corporation
code provisions, an amendment of the code by the legislature will require a considera-
tion of Item 20 by management. Even though various by-laws are submitted for ap-
proval or rejection as a whole, the form of the proxy should contain a separate ballot
with respect to each by-law or group of related by-laws involving material changes, in
addition to ballots for approval or rejection as a whole.
110. The final omnibus item, 21, simply provides that if action is to be taken with re-
spect to any matter not specified by the preceding items, its "substance" shall be "de-
scribed briefly ... in substantially the same degree of detail as is required in the Items
5 to 20," which call for designated data covering the various individually specified pro-
posals.
111. See Item 3(b) of Schedule 14A. See also Exchange Act Release No. 461 (Jan.
21,1936).
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beneath the name of the company, or by placing a bold-faced legend,
above the company name stating "Solicited on behalf of the Manage-
ment of . . ."
Paragraphs (a) (2) and (b) of X-14A-4 free the security holders from
the necessity of "straight-ticket" voting with respect to all matters
other than election to office." 2 The solicitor, however, under para-
graph (b) may in connection with matters other than elections to
office,"' employ a proxy which either (1) affords a choice between
approval and disapproval," 4 or (2) confers discretionary authority
with respect to approval or disapproval. But if discretionary authority
is sought, the proxy must state "in bold face type how it is intended to
vote" the shares." 5 Notwithstanding the fact that the opportunity
for an expression of approval or disapproval is required under the rule
only in connection with matters other than election to office, manage-
ment proxies have sometimes carried boxes to permit the security
holder to indicate a choice for or against the various candidates for
office. While this is, of course, not objectionable, since it permits in-
dividual consideration of the nominees, the accompanying proxy state-
ment should explain the effect of a negative vote in the election of
directors." 6 A similar matter that frequently arises is whether boxes
for indicating approval or disapproval must be provided in connection
with a proposal to fix the number of directors to be elected." 7
112. Insofar as election of officers is concerned, selectivity may be achieved by
cumulative voting. Cumulative voting is, however, entirely a matter of the law of the
state of incorporation, except for the informational requirements of X-14A-4(b) atid
Item 5(c) of Schedule 14A.
113. If the only matter to be acted upon is the election of directors, the form of
proxy need not specifically mention the election as to the matter to be acted upon.
114. Clause (2) of X-14A-4(a) requiring that the form of proxy shall identify
clearly and impartially each matter or group of related matters intended to be acted
upon, should be read with the first sentence of X-14A-4(b). However, identification by
subject matter is not necessarily required, and identifications such as "Proposal A" and
"Proposal B" are permissible where matching identifications are employed in the proxy
statement. See also note 109 supra.
115. For contrast of the phrase "intended to vote" in X-14A-4(b) with "will be voted"
in X-14A-4(e), see note 125 infra.
116. While a negative vote is commonly counted for purposes of determining a quorum,
the effect of a negative vote upon an election of directors ordinarily is to disenfranchise
the security holder, for the result of the election will not be affected by his vote, unless
there is only one nominee for a given directorship. Interesting questions of whether
negative votes cancel affirmative votes may arise where there is more than one uominee
and their affirmative votes are equal in number.
117. If the number of directors is required to be fixed each year incident to the election
of directors, and amendments to neither the charter nor by-laws are involved, no boxes
need be provided. However, boxes must be provided if the charter or by-laws are to be
amended to increase or decrease the number of directors to be elected. The matter of
election of directors should not, however, be confused with selection of auditors. Since
the selection of auditors is under the first sentence of X-14A-4 (b), a matter "other than
elections to office," opportunity for an expression of approval or disapproval is required.
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The 1948 proposals for amendment suggested that the requirement
of X-14A-4(a)(2), that the form of proxy "identify impartially" the
matters to be acted upon, be implemented by the addition of a third
sentence to X-14A-4(b) expressly providing that "The form of proxy
shall contain no recommendation .. ." 118 The Commission believes
that the proxy form is in essence a ballot by which the security holder
exercises his franchise and should not be used as campaign literature.
Consequently it is of the opinion that any recommendation manage-
ment wants to make should be set forth in the proxy statement rather
than in the form of proxy. However, management groups opposed the
prohibition against recommendations in the proxy form on the ground
that the security holders want to know management's position. After
fully considering the question, the Commission agreed that in all likeli-
hood it would be at least a convenience to stockholders, and perhaps
advantageous to them, to have the management's position identified on
the instrument by which they cast their vote. The Commission be-
lieved that, if the prohibition was construed as barring such identifica-
tion, it would exceed its intended purpose, and consequently the sug-
gested amendment was not adopted."" In some quarters the Commis-
sion's action was apparently regarded as authorizing the inclusion of
recommendations in the proxy form. It should be remembered, how-
ever, that in adopting the 1948 amendments the Commission expressly
stated that it would regard as contrary to the rule that matters to be
acted upon must be set forth clearly and impartially, any statement or
device which advocates any proposal, misleads or confuses the security
holder, brings pressure to bear upon him in the exercise of his right of
choice, or makes it mechanically more difficult for him to vote one way
rather than another. 2
The Commission did not adopt the 1948 proposal to modify the
X-14A-4(b) provisions with reference to proxies conferring upon a
solicitor discretionary authority regarding matters which he knows will
be presented at the meeting. But it did amend the X-14A-4(c) re-
quirements with respect to matters which the solicitor is not aware at
the time of the solicitation are to be presented, provided that a specific
statement is made to that effect in the proxy form or statement. This
privilege of obtaining a discretionary proxy, like the privilege afforded
118. Exchange Act Release No. 4114, p. 1 (July 6, 1948).
119. See address of former Commissioner Robert K. McConnaughey, mipra note 72.
120. Exchange Act Release No. 4185, p. 2 (Nov. 5, 1948). In the same release
the Commission added that among the devices which it would regard as contrary to
the rule are arguments or recommendations as to the merits of proposals, emphasis
upon the management's position beyond the mere statement of the fact that the manage-
ment favors or opposes a proposal, the use of arrows or any other visual device designed
to direct the stockholders' attention to the place on the proxy for voting one way and away
from the place for voting the contrary, and the switching of boxes, in order to procure
the result desired by the management.
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by the last sentence of X-14A-4(b), is available to both management
and opposition groups, if the requirements of the Rule are met. 2'
The two clauses of X-14A-4(d) express prohibitions respecting the
proxy form. One clause prohibits the nomination for election to office
of persons who do not intend to serve. The other bars premature
solicitations by preventing the use of a proxy which relates to other
than the next annual meeting. The first clause strikes at a practice
once common, an illustration of which may be found in a New York
case where it was held that a proxy solicitation was defective which
did not disclose that the directors elected had agreed prior to the
solicitation to resign in favor of another slate of candidates.'22 Whether
a given candidate is a bona fide nominee within the meaning of X-14A-
4(d) (1) presents, of course, a question of fact in each particular case.
Another problem arises under the requirement of X-14A--4(e) that
the proxy or proxy statement must specify that, subject to reasonable,
specified conditions, the shares represented by the proxy "will be
voted," and "will be voted" in accordance with the security holders'
specifications. The reason for the rule exists in the practice, at one
time common, of neglecting to vote proxies which were marked ad-
versely to the solicitor. This technique not only disenfranchised the
security holder, but simplified the solicitor's task of gaining a majority,
provided a quorum was secured. It was even possible to allow a few
adverse votes in the interests of reaching a quorum as long as a safe
majority could be achieved. The problem is illustrated in part by
Lizars v. Dahlberg. ' 2 The case grew out of the refusal by the manage-
ment of Certain-teed Products Corporation to have its proxy agents
attend the annual meeting at which directors were to be elected, The
litigation resulted in a decision upholding the Commission's view as
amicus curiae, that management, having solicited proxies under the
regulation for the election of directors, could not properly direct its
proxy agents to refrain from attending the meeting to avoid having
their proxies counted for the purpose of determining whether a quorum
existed. 2 4 As a consequence of X-14A-4(e) a proxy or proxy statement
may be cited as deficient if it states merely that "It is the intention that
121. It is also to be noted that the last sentence of X-14A-4(c) permits use of a
proxy conferring discretionary authority with respect to proposals omitted from the proxy
form and statement pursuant to X-14A-8 (c).
122. Wyatt v. Armstrong, 59 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. Ct. 1945). See also Levy v. Fel-
berg, 29 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct. 1941), rev'd mub. non. Levy v. American Brewing
Corp., 265 App. Div. 208, 38 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1st Dep't 1942).
123. Unreported opinion, Supreme Court of Baltimore City, Docket 1944, folio 264,
May 22, 1944.
124. After the court's decision management's proxy agents attended the adjourned
meeting, the voting at which resulted in the defeat of the management slate and election
of directors proposed by an opposition group.
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proxies not limited to the contrary will be voted in favor of said nomi-
nees." The rule requires modification of the quoted sentence to read
"Proxies not limited to the contrary will be voted in favor of said nomi-
nee." 125
While mechanically X-14A-5 is to the proxy statement what X-
14A-4 is to the proxy ballot, the former does not rise to the substantive
level of the latter. Except for X-14A-5(b) which in effect imposes
limits within which discretionary authority with respect to matters
to be acted upon may properly be sought, the entire rule is essentially
concerned merely with the physical and formal aspects of preparing a
proxy statement.
Some fairly sophisticated problems arise under X-14A-6 dealing
with the material required to be filed with the Commission prior to
undertaking solicitation.12 Following in the wake of the "waiting
period" provisions of X-14A-6(a) which call for the filing of the proxy,
proxy statement and other soliciting material ten days before use,1
is the requirement for the filing of "additional soliciting material." 123
It compels the submission of "additional soliciting material" at least
two days, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, prior to its
use. The "additional soliciting material" provision, however, is limited
to material emanating from the group or person filing a proxy state-
ment. It does not cover subsequent material in regard to the proxy
statement sent out by others. Recently a company president, who was
adverse to the action proposed by the 4-3 majority of the company
directors, had considered accompanying the majority's management
proxy statement with a letter urging security holders to vote against
the proposal. 12 The contemplated letter was not "additional soliciting
material" of the management, since the president was in the position
125. Compare 1948 Reliance Electric and Engineering Company proxy statement
with its 1949 proxy statement covering its January, 1950 meeting. Comparison of the
twro will also show that the statement in the former that "[i]f, for any reason, any nom-
inee is not available when the election occurs, the proxies will be voted for the election of
such other person or persons as shall be acceptable to the management" was recast to
comply more closely with X-14A-4 (which became finally effective on December 15,
1948) by substituting "not able to serve" for "not available." See address of former Com-
missioner McConnaughey, supra note 72, at 14-15.
126. Both preliminary and definitive material must be filed. See X-14A-6(a) and (c).
127. In computing the ten-day period, the filing date is counted as the first day, and the
eleventh day is the date the material may be mailed, in the absence of acceleration pur-
suant to the last clause of X-14A-6(a). During the waiting period the material is pro-
cessed for compliance with the regulation, and a deficiency or aclmowledgment letter
mailed to the filer. In the absence of deficiencies, acceleration is freely granted. See note
72 .supra. For a case in which the Commission's charges included the mailing of material
prior to the expiration of the "waiting period," see SEC v. McQuistion (S.D.N.Y. 1947)
announced in SEC Litigation Releases Nos. 403 and 420 (May 21 and Aug. 13, 1947).
128. X-14A--6 (b). -
129. See 1950 Warner Aircraft Corporation proxy statement.
19501
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
of opposing a majority of the directors. In order to have mailed the
letter, the company president would have had to have first filed the
letter and otherwise conformed it with the Regulation. Similarly, a
security holder who used the security holder "proposal" provisions of
X-14A-8 to urge adjournment of the annual meeting to afford him
time to complete his report on his investigation into alleged misconduct
of certain management nominees could not disseminate his report
until he had filed a proxy statement, since the report was not "addi-
tional soliciting material" of the management. 0
SECURITY HOLDER COMMUNICATIONS AND PROPOSALS
The value of information is proportioned directly to the extent it is
utilized. Rules X-14A-7 and X-14A-8 proceed on this theory, and
seek to stimulate participation in corporate affairs by affording security
holders methods of contacting their fellows. The problem and near
impossibility of securing a list of stockholders is approached through
X-14A-7. The rule does not make it possible for a security holder to
get possession of a list as such. Such a right depends upon state law.
However, the rule does obligate management, apart from recourse to
state courts and procedures, to mail 'a security holder's proxy state-
ment to the other security holders, if management "has made or in-
tends to make" any solicitation "with respect to the same subject
matter or meeting." In order to avail himself of the privilege afforded
by the rule, the security holder must (1) be entitled to vote on the
matter or at the meeting, (2) request in writing the information enu-
merated in paragraphs (a) (1) through (a) (3) of the rule, and (3) defray
the "reasonable" expenses to be incurred by the issuer in the perform-
ance of the acts requested. If he meets these requirements, the secu-
rity holder can obtain the details he needs in order to prepare his proxy
statement and place it in the hands of management for mailing."' If
management does not want to mail the security holder's proxy state-
ment, it has the option of turning over to the security holder a stock
list. 12
130. See 1949 Argus, Inc., proxy statement. Cf. X-14A-6(f) which, however, merely
relates to replies from security holders requesting further information as opposed to fur-
ther information offered to security holders incident to an X-14A-8 proposal. Other ma-
terial required to be pre-filed includes, as a consequence of the 1947 amendments, so-
called "educational" material furnished to personal solicitors by either management or
opposition groups. See Rule X-14A-6(d) and Exchange Act Release No. 4037 (Dec. 17,
1947).
131. See X-14A-7(a)(1)-(a)(3). See also X-14A-7(b) for further details con-
cerning the mechanics of mailing. It will be noted that the first sentence of paragraph
(b) makes it clear that the security holder, just as management, is not obligated to
solicit all his holders. To minimize his costs, therefore, he could direct that only the
holders of a specified number of shares are to be mailed his material.
132. See X-14A-7 (c).
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The principal shortcoming of X-14A-7 is that the solicited security
holder may receive adversaries' proxy statements at different times.
Consequently, one may not be available for comparison with the other
even though the Commission, where possible, tries to coordinate the
entry of its orders authorizing mailing so that both management's and
opposition groups' material may be mailed simultaneously. Many
stockholders either mail back the form of proxy at once and discard
the proxy statement or simply consign both to the nearest waste
basket.
X-14A-8, which permits a security holder to have his proposal in-
cluded in the management proxy statement, 3 is directed to minimiz-
ing this problem. Except in the instance of directors' elections, X-
14A-8 permits a security holder to have his proposal placed and con-
sidered in the context of management's proposals. Of special sig-
nificance is paragraph (b) of X-14A-S, which in addition affords the
security holder "100 words of reason" in support of his proposal, if it
is to be opposed by management.134 This in effect places the two sides
on a more nearly even plane, so that each has an opportunity to assert
the reasons for the action proposed. As a result, the security holders are
better able mutually to appraise the matter at one sitting, before they
mark their proxy. Moreover, the problem of coordinating receipt of
the contestants' material is solved.
35
The privilege accorded by X-14A-8 has sometimes been abused. In a
few cases managements have been badgered by proposals which ap-
parently were not submitted in good faith, or were submitted for the
purpose of achieving some ulterior personal objective unrelated to the
133. See X-14A--8(a). Note the "reasonable time" limitation in the first sentence of
the paragraph, a phrase expanded upon in the paragraph's second sentence. Note also the
last sentence of paragraph (a), which makes X-14A-8 inapplicable to elections to office.
The security holders proposal pro-isions were upheld in SEC. v. Transamerica Corp., 163
F2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947) cert. dcnied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948).
134. See X-14A-- (b).
135. It should be noted however, that a security holder who has merely availed himself
of the security holder proposal provisions of X-14A-8, and who has not filed a proxy
statement as contemplated by X-14A-6, cannot solicit persons who communicate with
him as a result of having read his "100 words of reason" and/or his proposal in the man-
agement proxy statement. Whether the security holders solicited vote for or against
management, therefore, depends upon the extent to which the opposition gets his case
before them through his 100 words and his proposal. A security holder may, however,
answer unsolicited questions submitted by persons responding to the 100 iords or the
proposal if his answers do not constitute a "solicitation" within the meaning of the
X-14A-1 definition. While he is likewise precluded from use of the proxy tombstone
provisions of X-14A-2(g), until he has filed and received authorization to mail a proxy
statement he can, of course, solicit a "total" of ten persons under X-14A-2(a). See also
Exchange Act Release No. 7020 (Dec. 2, 1946) for opinion holding that X-14A-8 does
not require inclusion of proposals of an "obviously ... political and economic nature."
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interests of sound and fair management of corporate affairs.13 In order
to avoid further abuses, the Commission amended the rule in 1948 to
provide that under certain specified circumstances, proposals sub-
mitted by security holders to the management may be omitted from
the management's proxy material. 117 The Commission, however, did
not make the amendment as stringent as was suggested by some man-
agement groups. To have done so would have resulted in virtually
nullifying the security holders' right to submit proposals. In approving
the amendments, the Commission was motivated first by a wish to
eliminate clear abuses without, however, infringing upon the legitimate
right of security holders to participate in the management of their
companies by initiating proposals, and, second, by the hope that the
possibilities of infringement upon the security-holders' proper franchise
can be avoided without involving the Commission in a series of deci-
sions turning upon slippery questions of motive. If the provision is
fairly and objectively applied by corporate managements, it should
achieve its objective of forestalling crackpot propositions without
impeding consideration of opposition proposals that have at least
debatable merit and are proper subjects for stockholder action.133
FRAUD
While it is difficult to appraise precisely the ultimate importance of
the informational requirements, it seems accurate to say that the in-
formational rules constitute the heart of the regulation. They are
positive in character. On the other hand, the anti-fraud prohibitions
are patently negative; their job is enforcement. By penalizing fraud,
they provide a motivation for compliance with the informational rules.
Rule X-14A-9 prohibits on grounds of fraud the use of any proxy
material or other communication, written or oral, containing false or
misleading statements of any material fact or omitting to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made not
misleading. The proxy fraud rule has been to couft more often than
any other proxy rule. It was also the first rule to receive judicial
scrutiny. 139
While the proxy fraud rule requires a full disclosure of all material
136. Address of former Commissioner McConnaughey, supra note 72.
137. See X-14A-8(c) and (d).
138. Address of former Commissioner McConnaughey, rupra note 72. The point wag
raised that if a proposal is omitted pursuant to the provision just discussed and security
holders nevertheless introduced the proposal at the meeting, the management could not
exercise discretionary authority in the matter because it was aware that the matter vaj
to be presented for action. Since this would operate to defeat the purpose of the new
provision regarding the omission of proposals, the Commission inserted express provi-
sions that the proposals so omitted need not be mentioned in the form of proxy and that
the management may exercise discretionary authority with respect to such proposals if
they are presented for action at the meeting. Rule X-14A-4 (a) and (c).
139. See note 142 infra. The Commission is not, however, confined to court action
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facts, a proxy statement is neither false nor misleading because it fails
to state all possible alternatives to the proposed course of action, or
because it does not contain statements concerning the motive of the
solicitor. The validity of this proposition was conceded in a Commis-
sion brief, and a federal district court has so held."'
The Commission has indicated that it does not consider that its
proxy rules, which apply to "any person" under Section 14(a), are
confined only to management and opposition groups. Their agents as
well as any other persons who solicit are within the ambit of the regula-
tion. Such an application of the regulation was considered by the
Commission in an administrative hearing 141 brought under Sec-
tion 15(b) of the Exchange Act to determine whether it should revoke
a broker-dealer registration. The charges were confined exclusively to
the possible violation of the proxy regulation by the broker-dealer.
The facts showed that a proxy soliciting group had represented that
its nominees for directors were bona fide, when it was known that at
least one of the nominees was not bona fide, because his undated resig-
nation had already been obtained. It also appeared that the group's
proxy statement as filed with the Commission contained various omis-
sions of material facts. While the Commission held that the evidence
did not "establish that [the broker-dealer] participated in or caused
the Investors Group to omit from its proxy statement the material
facts set forth in the order for hearing," the case is none the less illumi-
nating with respect to the scope of the application of the proxy fraud
and other rules, and the availability to the Commission of remedies
through administrative procedures and hearings.
SEC v. O'Hara Re-Election Committee 142 first announced the princi-
pal that the use of proxies may be enjoined when they are obtained as a
result of misleading proxy soliciting material. The Commission sought
to restrain the so-called O'Hara Re-Election (or Proxy) Committee
to enforce the proxy rules. It has other sanctions as well. One available under the Ex-
change Act, as well as other acts it administers, is the authority in its discretion to make
public under the second sentence of § 21(a), information concerning violations. About a
year after adoption of the LA rules, the Commission, presumably because of the circum-
stance that the proxy regulation was still in an early stage of development and the fraud
questions therefore somewhat novel, availed itself of the publicity sanction of 21(a). It
released a four page statement in connection with a management solicitation of security
holders of Consolidated Film Industries, Inc., which summarized the pertinent facts and
pointed out that the president's letter might be misleading. See Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 903 (Oct. 22, 1936). As to the comparable publicity sanction of the Securities
Act, see McCoamncC, UNDEMSTANDING TME SECumrms AcT AxD Trrn SEC 293 (1943).
The word "material" used in the proxy fraud rule is defined in X-1213-2 to include
"matters as to which an average prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed."
140. Doyle v. Milton, 73 F. Supp. 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
141. In the matter of Charles A. Massie, Exchange Act Release No. 3944 (April
12, 1947).
142. 28 F. Supp. 523 (D. ass. 1939). See discussion in Bernstein & Fischer, supra
note 31.
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from soliciting proxies from stockholders by means of misleading
letters. It appeared that after complying with the requirements of
the proxy rules, O'Hara sent out an additional letter of solicitation of
stockholders, urging them to return him to the management of the
corporation. His letter dealt generally with his version of mismanage-
ment by the existing directors, contained allegations against the di-
rectors individually, and included "a great deal of innuendo." Some of
these statements were false and misleading. After a hearing the district
court issued a preliminary injunction. The court's order not only en-
joined the use of the proxies, but, in order to avoid disenfranchisement
of the stockholders, directed that the meeting of stockholders be post-
poned to permit proper resolicitation of the stockholders whose proxies
were declared invalid. The court applied the same general use of its
injunction powers in a similar but unreported case, SEC v. National
Rubber Machinery Co., 143 enjoining not only the use of the proxies at a
stockholders' meeting scheduled to be held on the same day, but also
temporarily restraining the company from holding its meeting on the
date scheduled, except for the purpose of adjournment, in order that
re-enfranchisement and compliance might be effected.
In cases that have followed, arguments that the Exchange Act
should be narrowly construed to the point where the courts should only
enjoin unlawful solicitation under Section 21(e) have been rejected.
The courts have sustained the view that there may be granted to
the Commission relief reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose
of the proxy provisions to insure fair and honest solicition. Relief
granted has included a requirement that a meeting be postponed or
adjourned, 14 a prohibition on the use of proxies improperly obtained, "I
a requirement that a corrective statement be sent to stockholders, t'"
and a requirement for solicitation in conformity with the proxy rules. 4
Notwithstanding the presence of the administrative remedy as an
143. (N.D. Ohio 1944). But cf. SEC v. Okin, 58 F. Supp. 20 (S.D.N.Y. 1944),
when the court enjoined Oldn from using proxies obtained by false and misleading
material, but was "troubled" by the fact that its decision would disenfranchise security
holders who had given their proxies to him. The court felt that the result could not be
amended since neither the corporation nor the security holders were parties to the action.
144. SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 67 F. Supp. 326 (D. Del. 1946), modified on other
grounds, 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947); Tate v. Sonotone Corp., unreported, (Civ. No.
41-139, S.D.N.Y. April 15, 1947); Standard Gas and Electric Co. v. SEC, CCH Fn.
SEc. LAw REP. 190,400 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
145. SEC v. Okin, 58 F. Supp. 20 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); SEC v. Metropolitan Mines Corp.,
Ltd., Civil Doc. No. 664 (E.D. Wash. 1947); SEC v. McQuisten, Civil Doc. No. 41-47
(S.D.N.Y. 1947)
146. SEC v. Okin, 48 F. Supp. 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), modified, 137 F.2d 862 (2d Cir.
1943).
147. SEC v. Transamerica Corp., supra note 144. And see SEC v. Topping (S.D.N.Y.
1949), SEC Litigation Release No. 513 (April 29, 1949) and No. 543 (Oct. 6,
1949). For a recent case on the omission of a statement of probable adjournment as false
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adjunct to the institution of civil and criminal 141 cases in courts of law,
the most effective tool the Commission has in dealing with proxy fraud
is the opportunity for the detection and elimination of fraud incident
to the processing of proxy material during the ten-day waiting period,
and incident to the rendition of interpretative services from its vari-
ous regional offices. Examples of disclosures resulting from the Com-
mission's examination of preliminary proxy soliciting material ad-
equately demonstrate the effectiveness of this technique in giving
stockholders full information of insiders' plans to promote uncon-
scionable schemes. 149
SUGGESTED REVISIONS
Whatever the minor difficulties presently existing within the proxy
rules, their operation over 15 years of experience has become reasona-
bly smooth and efficient. The Commission has recently stated that
proxy rules "are probably the most useful of all the disclosure devices
established by our various acts and represent an effective contribution
to corporate democracy." "I
The principal difficulty in the employment of the proxy rules, there-
fore, is not found in the rules themselves, but in the limited scope of
their application. They do not apply, generally, to annual reports
and their financial statements, and they do not apply to solicitations of
proxies from holders of "unlisted" securities. This last limitation
and misleading, see Phillips v. The United Corp., CCH FED. SEc. LA, REP. f 90,395
(S.D.N.Y. 1947).
148. No criminal cases based e-xclusively on the proxy rules have been brought by the
Commission to date. In this connection refer to the notice-of-rules provisions of § 32(a)
of the Exchange Act.
149. An example of disclosure, resulting from the Commission's e.-mmination of pre-
liminary proxy soliciting material before it is mailed out, may be noted in one case in
particular among the hundreds of filings recently processed. It involved an intended
solicitation of proxies for the election of directors proposed by both the management and
a minority group. The management slate was headed by the company's chairman of
the board of directors, who had acquired a dominant position as a result of self-dealing,
inter-company transactions which had converted his original $150,000 investment into
company stock worth $246,950 and a promissory note from the company to him in the
amount of $650,000, or a total of $896,950. In addition, a former board chairman pur-
chased a subsidiary of the above company in consideration of his controlled company's
note for $250,000, and incident to a later stock transaction obtained a release and cancella-
tion of the controlled company's note. As a result of the processing of the proxy state-
ment, the Commission required that a full disclosure of these and other similar matters
be given the security holders in the proxy statement. See 14 SEC Axz,. REP. 39-40
(1948). For other disclosures obtained as a consequence of the processing of proxy
statements, see 15 SEC Am. REP. 49-51 (1949); 13 SEC Ax. REP. 42-3 (1941); 6
SEC ANN. REP. 113-116 (1940) ; 5 SEC AxN. REP. 60-2 (1939) ; 4 SEC Am;. Rrm.
69-70 (1938) ; and 3 SEC ANN. R P. 61 (1937).
150. REPORT OF THE SEC ON A PROPOSAL TO "SAuUARD INVSTRS nT U xMsrsTE=n
SEcuanr-s," HMR. Doe. No. 672, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1946). The report has been
brought down to date by a supplemental report recently transmitted to Congress. Ex-
change Act Release No. 4399 (Jan. 9, 1950).
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leaves a sizeable group of companies whose solicitations of proxies are
not subject to the Commission's regulations. The resultant hiatus in
the demands of full disclosure is also applicable to the registration and
reporting provisions of Sections 12 and 13, and to the "insider-trading"
provisions of Section 16 of the Exchange Act."' But the double stand-
ard of the disclosure requirements is not due to any well-defined policy
of limiting them to listed and registered companies.
Although Congress intended that investors in securities traded on
the over-the-counter market should have protection equal to investors
in listed securities,1 2 actual legislation has not been sufficiently exten-
sive to achieve that objective. Brokers and dealers in the over-the-
counter market have been subject to registration and regulation under
Section 15 of the Exchange Act and a series of amendments thereto.
In adopting the Holding Company Act in 1935, Congress made ap-
plicable to the securities of holding companies and their subsidiaries,
whether or not such securities were registered on exchanges, protective
provisions similar to Sections 12, 13, 14 and 16 of the Exchange Act.
In 1936 Congress adopted Exchange Act Section 15(d),113 requiring
the filing of annual and periodic reports, including financial state-
ments, by any issuer thereafter registering under the Securities Act
any issue aggregating $2,000,000, even though the issue was not
registered on an exchange. The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 provided
that issuers qualifying indentures under the Act were subject to the
reporting requirements governing companies having securities regis-
tered on national exchanges.1 4 Finally, the Investment Company
Act, like the Holding Company Act, subjected securities of registered
investment companies to requirements similar to those of Sections 12,
13, 14, and 16 of the Exchange Act, whether or not the securities were
registered on exchanges. 55 Such fragmentary development has left
important gaps in the protective scheme.
In 1946, the SEC estimated that there were in the United States
3,090 companies with $3,000,000 in assets and 300 or more security
holders, excluding banks.' 6 Of these, some 1,600 were registered with
151. The application and reporting provisions of §§ 12 and 13 apply only to companies
with securities listed on an exchange; § 16 requires publicity to the holdings and trading
of officers, directors, and principal (more than 10 per cent) stockholders, in the cquity
securities of their company if that company has equity securities listed on an exchange.
152. Section 15 of the Exchange Act, as originally enacted, made it unlawful for
brokers and dealers to trade in the over-the-counter market in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission might prescribe "as necessary or appropriate
in the public interest and to insure the investors protection comparable to that provided by
and under the authority of this title in the case of national securities exchanges." 48
STAT. 895 (1933-1934). See also Exchange Act § 2.
153. See §§ 5, 12(e), 14 and 17, Holding Company Act.
154. § 314(a) (1), Trust Indenture Act.
155. See § 8, 20(a), 24 and 30, Investment Company Act.
156. REPoRT OF THE SEC, op. cit. supra note 150, at 25-7.
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the Commission under various acts; 500 more had to make reports
comparable to those required by the SEC to another federal or state
agency. This left an estimated 1,000 companies not then filing reports
with any public agency.'57 In so far as proxy-soliciting practices are
concerned, the report shows that many of the companies not effecting
filings with the Commission are still following practices which Con-
gress attempted to rectify as to listed companies by adopting Sec-
tion 14 of the Exchange Act.--"
In 1946 the Commission proposed an amendment to cure the deficien-
cies existing in connection with non-registered securities.' The Com-
mission did not then press for immediate legislative action, but it has
recently asked for separate consideration of the proposal, which is now
embodied in the Frear Bill.' Currently the bill is before the Senate
Banking and Currency Committee, after hearings before a subcom-
mittee.' 6 ' By way of general summarization, the bill would add a new
subsection (g) to Section 12 of the Exchange Act, requiring companies
engaged in interstate commerce, or in business affecting interstate
commerce, or the securities of which are regularly traded in interstate
commerce, to register with the Commission such of their securities
as are not registered on an exchange. Such companies would file
periodic reports similar to those filed in respect of securities registered
on an exchange, and their securities would be subject to the provisions
of Exchange Act Sections 14 and 16 whether or not a registration state-
ment has been filed.
Issuers subject to the proposed amendment would be those having
at least $3,000,000 in assets and at least 300 security holders. The
amendment is qualified by certain exemptions, among them being a
provision making Section 14 inapplicable to any solicitation in respect
of an unlisted security held by fewer than 300 persons. Another provi-
sion safeguards corporate action by exempted companies from any
157. Id. The 1950 supplemental report by the SEC places the figure at 1,113 companies
which are not presently filing with the Commission and 648 companies which file some
but not all of the reports required by the Commission. See Exchange Act Release No.
4399, supra note 150.
158. Id. at 17-20 et seq. The report supplementing the 1946 survey "indicates that the
need for legislation has not diminished since 1946.... [T]here appears to have been no
significant change since 1946 in the reporting and proxy soliciting practices of the cor-
porations which would be affected by the proposal."
159. Id. at 31, 32. The New York Fxchanges have gone on record in the past in sup-
port of a program comparable to the present proposal. See REmoar oF Tan SEC o,.
Pn oosALs FOR AISENDMENTS TO THE Sacuars Acr or 1933 AIM THM SECuUnms EF-
CHANGE Acr OF 1934, House Committee Print, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1941).
160. S. 2403, introduced August 8, 1949. A companion bill, H.R. 7005, was introduced
in the house on January 26, 1950.
161. See Hearings on S. 2408 before the Subcommittee of the Scnate Comntiltce on
Banking and Currency, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 7-10, 1950) ; Wall Street Journal, Feb.
8, 1950, p. 4, col. 3.
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cloud of invalidity that might otherwise result from a violation of
Section 14.
The Frear Bill presents a necessary adjunct to the present regulation
of proxy solicitation, as well as a necessary enlargement of the applica-
tion of Sections 12, 13 and 16 to all large, publicly-held companies.
The proposed amendment, as drafted, should not create substantial
additional burdens to the new companies encompassed by the amend-
ment. 1 2 And such burdens as are added will be substantially out-
weighed by the significant advancement in corporate democracy em-
bodied in the bill.
The Frear bill does not remove all the limitations in Section 14 and
Regulation X-14 which, in many cases, still prevent security holders
adequate information. Section 14 and Regulation X-14 require the
submission of a proxy statement only when proxies are solicited. And
Regulation X-14 does not, in most cases, prescribe the form and
content of, or the information to be included in, the annual report
and financial statements which must accompany the proxy state-
ment. Some managements control sufficient voting stock to obtain
a quorum at the annual meeting and therefore do not have to solicit
proxies.1 3 Other managements, although not controlling a quorum,
may simply fail to solicit proxies with the result that a quorum is not
obtained and they are continued in office by default
1 4
The larger percentage of managements who do solicit proxies may
still not be affording their security holders a complete picture of the
company's condition and results of its -operations. An annual report
containing a financial statement must be sent to the security holder
in addition to the proxy statement if directors are to be elected at the
annual meeting. 6' Since an election of directors is included in a very
large percentage of annual meetings, the regulations require that
security holders receive a financial statement in most cases.' But the
regulation does not prescribe the information to be given in the annual
report, nor the form and content of the financial statement. The an-
nual report and financials are not even subject to the fraud provisions
of the regulation or the Exchange Act.' Thus, even if listed com-
162. REPORT OF THE SEC, op. cit. supra note 150, states that 85 per cent of the financial
statements contained in the annual reports of 119 non-registered companies surveyed were
certified by public accountants. Generally speaking, certification is a representation of
adequate records to support the summary statement certified. The companies all had
total assets of over $3,000,000 and more than 300 stockholders.
163. Some corporation acts almost eliminate quorum difficulties. See, e.g., OHIO
GEx. CODE § 8623-48 (Page, 1949).
164. See REPORT OF THE SEC, supra note 159, at 35.
165. X-14A-3 (b).
166. See note 81 supra.
167. See pages 652-4 supra. X-14A-3(b) provides in part, that security holders shall
be sent an annual report, "containing such financial statements ...as will, in the opinion
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panies, and, with the passage of the Frear Bill, almost all other large,
publicly held companies, have to file annual and interim reports with
the Commission, there is no assurance that such information ill get
to their security holders.'
In 1941 the Commission recommended to Congress that Section 14
of the Exchange Act be amended to require, among other things, that
issuers submit to their security holders, prior to annual meetings, the
information required by the proxy rules.Ic This proposal would obviate
the difficulty presented by managements who refuse to solicit proxies
in order to avoid sending security holders a proxy statement. But it
would not insure an adequate annual report or financial statement.
The mandate of full disclosure would seem to indicate, therefore,
that the regulations be amended to provide that the annual report and
financial statement disseminated in connection with annual meetings
follow the general requirements of Form 10-K which in general pre-
scribes the content of annual reports required of most listed com-
panies. 170 The result would be, of course, that the form and content of
the financial statement would be governed by the Commission's ac-
counting regulation, Regulation S-X.
The non-financial information afforded by the proxy statement,
while adequate in itself, is in many instances only required to be given
if a certain item of business is to be considered at the annual meeting.
Yet other matters may be relevant as a matter of good stewardship.
Some managements might wish merely to send security holders copies
of their Form 10-K, plus such other information as the proxy regula-
tion requires. Others might wish to supplement their proxy statement
with such basic Form 10-K non-financial information as the Commis-
sion may deem necessary to insure adequate disclosure in the annual
report. In any event a synthesis of requirements should, of course,
be established so that multiple reporting may be avoided.
of management, adequately reflect the financial position and operations of the issuer. Such
annual report, including financial statements, may be in any form deemed suitable by
management!'
168. See the criticism of the inadequate financial statements contained in the annual
reports of 119 large, non-registered companies in REroRT o Trg SEC, op. cit. supra note
150, at 10-16, and Appendix C. For a similar criticism of the financials in the 1937 an-
nual reports of 70 registered companies, see KAIL'x & R nG.u, Accounting, Reports to
the Stockholders, and the SEC, 48 YA.n L.J. 935 (1939).
169. See RPORT OF THE SEC, op. cit. supra note 159.
170. See §§ 12, 13, and 15(d) of the Exchange Act. Section 12 provides that any com-
pany desiring to list its securities on an exchange must file vith the Commission and with
the exchange an application on Form 10 containing financial and other information deemed
sufficient for intelligent investor action. This information is kept up to date by the re-
quirement of filing current and quarterly reports on Forms 8-K and 9-K, and an annual
report on Form 10-K. See Exchange Act §§ 13 and 15(d). Financial statements accom-
panying these reports are governed as to form and content by the accounting regulation,
S-X.
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Aside from the financial statements, any adequate annual report
should contain, at the least, such basic Form 10-K information as that
dealing with parents and subsidiaries of the registrant (Item 2 of
10-K) ; material changes in business (Item 3); developments'in pend-
ing proceedings (Item 4); names and addresses of directors and officers
(Item 5); business experience (not previously reported) of executive
officers (Item 6); indemnification of directors and officers (Item 7);
intent of management in material transaction (Item 10); and informa-
tion as to outstanding options, warrants, or rights (Item 13). The other
items of Form 10-K are dealt with in Regulation X-14 itself, although
usually the information required by the Regulation is less complete
than that specified in Form 10-K.171
Accompanying this amendment relating to annual reports and
financials, there should be a companion amendment repealing the
provisions of X-14A-3(c) which operate to remove them from the
fraud provisions of X-14A-9 and the civil liabilities of Section 18
of the Exchange Act. There should be not only full disclosure, but
also full responsibility for the truthfulness or falsity of the disclosures
made by management as fiduciaries to the owners of the business, the
security holders.
171. In the instance of unregistered gas and electric companies, the information should
be generally comparable to that contained in the annual reports filed with the Commission
by utility companies registered under the Holding Company Act.
COMMUNICATION
"In my article 'Natural Law and Natural Rights,' in the
January issue of the Yale Law Journal, I referred on page 236
to Heinrich Rommen, Die Ewige Wiederkehr des Naturrechis.
This book was written during Nazi domination. It contained
nothing that "was contrary to Nazi theory, but also nothing
that supported it. Rommen, however, was not a Nazi, but a
Catholic Socialist. He was briefly arrested by the Nazis but
soon released. A second and enlarged edition of his book,
published in 1947, gives a fuller statement of his views. It is
only fair to make this correction."
-MAX RADIN
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